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PROTECTING SEX- SEXUAL DISINCENTIVES
AND SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION IN
NGUYEN V. INS
LAURA WEINRIB "
"Male and female are created through the eroticisation of dominance and
submission. The man/woman difference and the dominance/submission
dynamic define each other.... The feminist theory of knowledge is
inextricable from the feminist critique ofpower because the male point of
view forces itself upon the world as its way of apprehending it. "'
- Catharine MacKinnon
Catharine MacKinnon's famous formulation of the social and
political struggle between men and women as a manifestation of men's
sexual subordination of women has informed feminist debate for the past
two decades. The fundamental project of radical feminism was to
demonstrate that sex discrimination and sexual domination are one and the
same. Against this backdrop, recent developments in feminist and queer
theory have turned the equivalence of sex and sexuality inside out-a
dissociation that has played out prominently in the context of legal
scholarship, particularly with respect to rape, pornography, and sexual
harassment. This effort to rehabilitate "deviant" sexuality entails rescuing
the fight against sex discrimination from the vilification of sex.
Whatever one's feelings on the relationship between sex and sex-
based discrimination, they are likely to be reserved for academic debate.
The successful application of equal protection doctrine to such sex-laden
topics as birth status, contraception, and abortion has had the unfortunate
side-effect of submerging judicial discussion of sexual subordination and
sexual freedoms in favor of less contentious issues of biological equality
and difference. The blanket omission of sexuality from sex discrimination
decisions-despite the sustained theoretical frenzy surrounding the issue-
is striking.
This Article considers a recent United States Supreme Court
decision to explore the tension between sexuality and equal protection
doctrine and to explain the practical ramifications of the erasure of the
* B.A., Harvard College, 2000; M.A., Harvard University, 2000; J.D.
Candidate, Harvard Law School, 2003. My sincere gratitude to Professor
Janet Halley for her thoughtful comments and contributions over several
drafts of this Article.
Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence. 8 Signs: J. Women in Culture and Society 635, 635-636 (1983).
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former from the latter. It identifies a sex-regulatory element of immigration
law that could, in theory, be incorporated into a sex discrimination claim.
But it suggests that such a claim, even if it were to succeed (an unlikely
prospect) within the current doctrinal framework, would achieve only as
much as any discrimination claim can-it would compel the government to
treat everyone equally well or equally badly. This Article, then, is chiefly a
descriptive undertaking. Its objective is to point out the omission of
sexuality from current doctrine and to identify the ramifications of that
omission.
In 2001, the Supreme Court decided Nguyen v. INS,2 a case that
challenged one of the last facially discriminatory statutes that remains on
the books.3 Title 8 U.S.C. § 14094 specifies the naturalization procedures
for the foreign-born children of unmarried United States citizens. The child
of an unmarried citizen-mother is considered to have acquired United States
citizenship at birth as long as her mother has at some point prior to
childbirth lived in the United States or its territories for a continuous period
of one year.5 For the child of an unmarried citizen-father, however, the
naturalization requirements are far more burdensome.6
Those additional burdens weighed heavily on Tuan Anh Nguyen.
Born in Saigon to a Vietnamese mother and an American father,7 Nguyen
arrived in the United States at the age of five and lived with his father in
Texas throughout his minority. At the age of twenty-two, Nguyen pled
guilty to two counts of sexual assault on a child, and the INS initiated
deportation proceedings.8 In 1998, in Miller v. Albright,9 Justices Stevens
2 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
3 Brief for Petitioners at 9, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071).
4 Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 309, 66 Stat. 238, as amended and
presently in force, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1994).
' 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c).
6 See discussion infra Part lI.B. The requirements are set out in 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1409(a)(1), (3), and (4).
7 It is unclear from the court documents whether Joseph Boulais, a former member
of the United States Army, traveled to Vietnam for reasons related to his military service.
The petition for certiorari relates that "Boulais stayed in Vietnam after his honorable
discharge from the military." Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), petition for cert. filed,
2000 WL 1706737 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2000) (No. 99-2071). It seems likely, however, that
Boulais in fact arrived in Vietnam after his discharge. The Petitioners' brief states,
"[Boulais] served in Germany, receiving an honorable discharge in January 1963. Following
his discharge from the army, Boulais relocated to Vietnam. In 1969, while he was working
for Pacific Architect Engineer, a military contractor, he began a relationship with a
Vietnamese citizen, Hung Thi Nguyen. As a result of that relationship, Boulais's son, Tuan
Anh Nguyen ("Nguyen"), was born in Vietnam on September 11, 1969." Brief for
Petitioners at 4, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071) (citations omitted).
8 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.
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and Rehnquist failed to assemble a majority willing to decide whether
§ 1409(a) discriminated on the basis of sex in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy concurred in the
judgment on the basis that the plaintiff in that case, the daughter of a
citizen-father, lacked standing.'0 In Nguyen, the petitioners therefore
pursued the equal protection claim of Nguyen's father, Michael Boulais.
Section 1409(a), they argued, impermissibly discriminated against fathers.
The five-justice majority rejected Boulais's equal protection claim,
holding that § 1409(a) serves at least two important governmental
objectives: it facilitates the identification of a biological parent-child
relationship, and it ensures the opportunity for "everyday ties that provide a
connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United
States."" The Court further found that § 1409(a) accomplished these
objectives through substantially related means. The dissent criticized the
majority for its reliance on sex-based stereotypes about childbearing and
rejected both of the purported governmental interests. Because the majority
was unable to identify an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the sex-
based classification created by § 1409(a), the dissent would have found an
equal protection violation.
To date, there have been markedly few academic defenses of the
Court's decision in Nguyen and of the similar arguments in Miller. Rather,
camps that agree on little else have come together to criticize the majority
opinion as sexist, narrow-minded, and patently conservative.' 2 The critiques
seem to betoken a partial victory for the feminist ideals of an earlier
generation: critics and the dissenting justices are practically unanimous in
their willingness to accept that preferential treatment of mothers amounts to
entrenching gender norms. While I agree that § 1409(a) carries many
undesirable consequences, it is not clear to me that symbolic indicia of
subordination and stereotyping are chief among them, nor that equal
9 523 U.S. 420 (1998). For a description of the various opinions in Miller see
discussion infra Part I.B.
10 Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred on the basis that the claim was not
justiciable at all. Id. at 453 (Scalia, J., concurring). Since the Constitution imbues Congress
with the plenary authority to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," U.S. Const. art.
I, § 8, cl. 4, Miller would remain an alien barring a "congressional enactment granting [her]
citizenship." Miller, 523 U.S. at 453 (Scalia, J., concurring). Simply put, "[t]he complaint
must be dismissed because the Court has no power to provide the relief requested: conferral
of citizenship on a basis other than that prescribed by Congress." Id.
1 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63.
12 But see Katharine B. Silbaugh, Miller v. Albright: Problems of
Constitutionalization in Family Law, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 1139, 1141, & n.9 (1999) (noting that
the pervasive criticism of Miller v. Albright overlooks the crucial family law ramifications of
the case, which lend some support to the majority opinion).
[Vol. 12:1224
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protection analysis of the kind propounded by the dissent is the best means
of redressing them.
13
Nguyen is about more than formal inequality-it is about writing
sexual subordination out of the narrative in order to prevent it down the
road. Childbirth, unlike employment discrimination or educational barriers,
is uniquely sexual in its origin. So long as children are born predominantly
through sex, sexual relationships deserve consideration. Radical feminism,
whatever its failings, facilitates an important intervention. If sex
discrimination is premised on the possibility of sexual abuse, then the
desirability of confining women to the home, as married mothers, originates
in sex-and the exclusion of children produced through non-normative
sexual acts, unless they are redeemed by their fathers, makes all the sense in
the world.
Part I of this Article sketches the legal backdrop against which
Nguyen was decided. Nguyen is situated at the intersection of several
distinct bodies of developing law. As a sex-based equal protection claim,
Nguyen challenges a statute that facially discriminates against men, a class
that is neither traditionally suspect nor anything close to a discrete and
insular minority. It is reflective of the pervasive success of feminist legal
reform efforts of the past decades that even the majority was more
interested in examining the implications of § 1409(a) for stereotyping
women as traditional caregivers than in the barriers to citizenship imposed
uniquely on the children of men, which the Court dismissed as
administrative inconveniences. Nevertheless, the majority ultimately rested
its validation of the policy on biological essentialism. "The difference
between men and women in relation to the birth process is a real one," the
majority emphasized, "and the principle of equal protection does not forbid
Congress to address the problem at hand in a manner specific to each
gender.'
14
Although Nguye came to the Supreme Court as a sex
discrimination case, it is first and foremost an immigration case. The
majority declined to dismiss the case on the grounds of Congress's plenary
immigration power (though neither did they take the opportunity to overrule
the doctrine). The ramifications of Ngyen's status as a case about
naturalization and citizenship are nevertheless indispensable to the Court's
analysis of Nguyen's equal protection claim. More broadly, citizenship and
sex are closely related, both historically and symbolically.
13 The most obvious critique of the dissent pertains to family law concerns. Those
who decry Nguyen are willing to undermine one of women's only legal advantages-
parenthood privileges-in order to level the playing field over the long run. This strategy has
received a good deal of attention in the broader context of parental rights (specifically, child
custody and putative father registries), and though it is conspicuously missing from the equal
protection analysis of Nguyen, it is not the subject of this Article.
14 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73.
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Part II reviews the majority and dissenting opinions in Ng en and
highlights the tensions between those opinions and the precedent outlined in
Part I. Part III begins with a critique of Nguyen with respect to the
inadequacies of equal protection doctrine. It then examines sex and
sexuality and their omission from the legal and academic discussions of
Nguyen in particular and sex discrimination in general. The question, for
the purposes of this Article, is not on what alternative basis Nguyen might
have been decided that would have avoided encountering these
shortcomings of equal protection analysis. 5 Rather, I ask, what is the cost
of omitting sex from the discussion? Nguyen is not just about men and
women. It is, fundamentally, a case about sex. Limiting the discussion to
equal protection analysis has occluded the inherently sexual dimension of
Nguyen's saga-from the sex that produced Nguyen to the sex that got him
deported. Is there a role, then, for reading the regulation of sexuality into
purportedly unsexualized laws? What are the costs of not doing so? And
even if there is a descriptive benefit to such an undertaking, is it relevant to
the project of normative legal reform?
15 Conceivably, substantive due process, following Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), might provide such a basis. Despite the fall from favor of the privacy/decisional
autonomy cases in the last decade, the fight to decide whether to bear or beget a child seems
fairly secure, at least for the time being. The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether
fornication laws are constitutional. Nevertheless, one might argue on the basis of Eisenstadt
that it is impernissible to discourage fornication by regulations incidental to fornication.
Unlike Eisenstadt, however, there is no more closely tailored option available to the
government-after all, the U.S. government cannot regulate sex outside U.S. borders.
Moreover, there is no parallel intrusion on the rights of married people. The retreat from
privacy rights in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and the current configuration of
the Court suggest that premising this case on the right to engage in non-maital sex outside
U.S. borders would have been a legal mistake, even if sex is what the case was really about.
However, a due process claim, if tenable, would have facilitated the recognition that
women's sex is uniquely targeted by the statute. See discussion infra Part III.A.
It should be noted, in this context, that the Court will reconsider the question of
whether restrictions on private sexual activity impinge on liberty and privacy, in violation of
due process, in Lawrence v. Texas. The petition for certiorari in Lawrence has convincingly
put forward an argument for insulating gay sex from state intervention on the basis that, "To
Americans, nothing is more personal and private than sexual relations between consenting
adults behind closed doors." Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001), petition
for cert.filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. July 16, 2002) (No. 02-102). The petition quotes from
the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion in Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18. 24 (Ga. 1998),
which struck down on state law grounds the very statute at stake in Bowers: "We cannot
think of any other activity that reasonable persons would rank as more private than unforced,
private, adult sexual activity." Id. at 25. However, the Petitioners' argument is fundamentally
based on a privacy rationale that, even if successful, would not lend itself to use in
invalidating incidental burdens on sexual freedom. While it might preclude the United States
from explicitly regulating the sexual practices of US citizens abroad, it seems highly unlikely
that any holding in Lawrence would prohibit the United States from discouraging such sex
through adverse citizenship requirements for potential offspring.
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I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The narrative disjunction of Nguyen's legal course complements
the complexity of his constitutional challenge. Although the purpose of this
Article is to explore what is missing in the Court's analysis of Nguyen v.
INS-and in equal protection precedent in general-that task cannot be
accomplished without first assessing what is present. Given the many
parallels and inconsistencies between Nguyen and recent equal protection
decisions, it will be useful to review the relevant developments in sex-based
equal protection doctrine as it applies to citizens, and particularly those
cases that discriminate against fathers. The subsequent section sketches the
historical backdrop for equal protection claims in the immigration context.
A. Sex Discrimination
As a general matter, the Supreme Court has been steadily more
comprehensive in its invalidation of sex-based discriminatory laws and
policies. Particularly in light of the landmark anti-discriminatory outcome
of United States v. Virginia,16 decided in 1996, the apparent retreat in
Nguyen came to many as an unpleasant surprise. Much of the litigation
strategy surrounding sex discrimination cases has centered on the standard
of review, which after three decades remains conspicuously ambiguous.
7
The Court first applied the Equal Protection Clause to sex-based
classifications in 1971, in Reed v. Reed.' 8 Shortly thereafter, in Frontiero v.
Richardson,' 9 four Justices deemed sex a suspect classification subject to
strict scrutiny, but they were unable to persuade the remainder of the Court.
In 1976, with something approaching unanimity, the Court arrived at a
compromise and introduced the category of intermediate scrutiny for sex
discrimination, 20 reasoning that "previous cases establish that classifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives." 2 1
Intermediate scrutiny took on somewhat more bite in the early
1980s. In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 2 the Court called
16 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
17 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting ambiguity of heightened scrutiny in sex-discrimination cases).
18 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that an Idaho statute that favored men in
designating administrators of estates violated equal protection).
19 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
20 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976).
21 Id. at 197.
22 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
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for, but was unable to find, an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for
excluding men from a women's nursing school. Though not the first case to
23invalidate discrimination against men, Hogan was influential in
differentiating preferential treatment of women as a traditionally
disadvantaged sex from impermissibly burdening men's rights. The Court's
reasoning was premised substantially on the notion of stereotype-
"traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men
and women" 24 --which figures prominently in the sex-based equal
protection challenges of the 1990s and became decisive in the Nguyen
dissent.
Subsequent application of Hogan has been inconsistent at best.
Nevertheless, the "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard achieved
full force, despite the vocal disapproval of Justice Scalia, in United States v.
Virginia, the celebrated 1996 case ordering the admission of women to the
Virginia Military Institute.2 5 Although physical differences between men
and women endure, the majority concluded, sex-based classifications
cannot be used to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic
inferiority of women.26 Virginia is further notable for introducing the notion
of reasonable accommodation of physical differences between women and
men,27 suggesting such innovations as women's barracks and adjusted
physical qualifications and training.28 The Court, it seemed, had abandoned
formal equality, 29 simultaneously recognizing physical difference and
denying it normative power.
Given the rhetoric in Virginia, Ng en's retreat to biological
difference may at first glance seem surprising. Closer examination of cases
dealing with parenthood, however, reveals that the Court has on several
prominent occasions upheld facial discrimination against fathers on the
basis of "physical differences. The Court's willingness to tolerate
23 Earlier cases include Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), Michael M. v.
Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), and Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979).
24 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725-26.
25518 U.S. 515 (1996).
26 Many scholars, as well as Justice Scalia in his dissent, have noted that Virgini
effectively applies strict scrutiny under the guise of intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 571-576.
27 The Court required the state to use what amounted to the "least restrictive
means" to accomplish its purpose, a condition previously reserved for strict scrutiny. Id. at
573 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28
Id. at 550-51 n. 19.
29 Previously, the Court had required either equal treatment or abandonment of the
statute at issue. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 738 (1984).
30 Courts have typically upheld differential treatment in cases of biological
difference and as remedy for past discrimination. See Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer,
228 [Vol. 12:1
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differential treatment is especially evident in the context of pregnancy-
related classifications. The first notable equal protection case to uphold
pregnancy-based differentiation between men and women was Geduldig v.
Aiello, 31 decided in 1974, in which the Court premised its holding that the
state of California need not cover normal pregnancy under its state
disability insurance program largely on the fact that not all women become
32 3pregnant. Similarly, in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County,33
the Court held that sex-based distinctions were permissible as long as they
"realistically reflect[ed] the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in
certain circumstances., 34 A statutory rape law penalizing only men did not
violate equal protection, because women are adequately deterred by the risk
of pregnancy.
The intuitive appeal of the notion that pregnancy "really is
different" has repercussions beyond pregnancy itself. Courts have been
overwhelmingly willing to uphold statutes, especially in the context of
family law, that discriminate against fathers. Particularly relevant is a line
of cases beginning with Stanley v. Illinois35 that reflects a proposition
known as "biology plus"--that the Constitution protects the parental rights
of unmarried fathers who have taken on parental responsibility.36 Lehr v.
United States v. Virginia's New Gender Equal Protection Analysis with Ramifications For
Pregnancy, Parenting, and Title VII, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 845, 868-69 (1997).
" 417 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1974).
32 Id. at 497. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000),
protects pregnant women from employment discrimination, but it does not apply to family
law or criminal law. Nan Hunter notes that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act has been
somewhat ineffectual in ending discrimination. The Sex Discrimination Argument in Gay
Rights Cases 9 J.L. & Pol'y 397, 403 n.26.
33 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981).
34 Id. at 469.
" 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In Stanley, the Court struck down an Illinois statute
making non-marital children wards of the state upon the death of their mothers because it
impermissibly distinguished between married and unmarried fathers. Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380 (1979), in which the Court invalidated on equal protection grounds a New
York law permitting adoption of a non-marital child without the consent of the father, is also
relevant.
36 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), is a notable example. A Georgia law
prohibited a biological father who had not "legitimated" his children from interfering in their
adoption. In Quilloin, the child's father sought to preclude the adoption of his son, for whom
he had provided only intermittent financial support, by the mother's husband. He did not
seek custody or object to the child living with his mother and her husband. The trial court
determined that adoption would be in the child's best interest. The Supreme Court affirmed,
suggesting that while an effort to disband a family over the objection of the parents and
children with no showing of unfitness might violate due process, "the result of the adoption
in this case is to give full recognition to a family unit already in existence, a result desired by
all concerned . Id. at 255.
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Robinson,37 decided by the Supreme Court in 1983, introduced the notion of
fatherhood as a biological opportunity that, when grasped, confers parental
rights.38 In Nguye, the language of "opportunity" resurfaces. This time,
however, mere opportunity is sufficient-and opportunity is afforded
women naturally.39 Conversely, even a close father-child relationship of the
kind described in Lehr is apparently inadequate to justify equal protection
of the law.
Perhaps the greater judicial deference in the context of childrearing
reflects that parenting is the last stronghold of permissible stereotyping.
One must be careful, however, not to conclude too hastily that laws
burdening fathers must uniformly be stamped out in the interest of equality.
There is indeed a set of real differences between fathers and mothers for the
purposes of pregnancy law in particular and for family law more generally.
Even if the law were to retreat to formal equality, the representation of a
relationship-whether one must treat all parents the same, regardless of sex,
or whether one may differentiate between pregnant and non-pregnant
would-be parents4 0-can make all the difference.
41
17463 U.S. 248 (1983).
38 Id. at 262 ("The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the
natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his
offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the
child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely
valuable contributions to the child's development."). In Lehr, the Court upheld a statute that
permitted the adoption of a child without notification to her father in cases where the father
had not demonstrated a "full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood." Id. at 248.
Where a father had not legally formalized his paternity, he needed to demonstrate a
"significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship," id. at 262, in order to claim equal
protection and due process rights; "because appellant, like the father in Quilloin, has never
established a substantial relationship with his daughter, ... the New York statutes at issue in
this case did not operate to deny appellant equal protection...."/d. at 267. The Court held
that unmarried fathers were "similarly situated" to mothers only if they satisfied at least one
of the statutory requirements. Id. at 267.
39 See discussion infra Part II.B.
40 One obvious potential repercussion of absolute equality on the basis of
parentage would be allowing the father equal rights to the abortion of a fetus; with bodies out
of the equation entirely, it is difficult to make a principled distinction purely by virtue of the
"accident" that women bear children. The response, of course, is that fathers attain equal
rights only once their children are born; until that point, there is no child with whom to forge
a father-child relationship. One might also argue that pregnant "people" have unique rights.
The dangers of this approach are palpable in both Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494-95
(1974), supra note 31, and in Nguyen itself. Ultimately, the better course seems to be a
weighing of burdens and benefits; women's bodies and autonomy are simply threatened by
pregnancy in a manner that men's are not. The ramifications of the fact that biology can
make a difference are discussed at length in Part III. Cf Silbaugh, supra note 12, at 1154
("Given the pervasiveness of certain 'stereotypes,' such as initial maternal custody of, and
responsibility for, a newborn baby, laws that pretend that fathers and mothers of newborns
are similarly situated can do real harm in some cases. State laws, for example, seek to
facilitate the placement of newborns for adoption as quickly as possible. Because mothers
230 [Vol. 12:1
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B. Immigration
In order to appreciate the relationship among § 1409(a), sex
discrimination, and sexuality, one must be familiar with the history of
immigration law in this country as an outcrop of government regulation of
sex, marriage, and citizenship. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act 42 provides that a child born abroad to an unmarried
mother who is a United States citizen may claim United States citizenship
so long as the mother has been physically present in the United States, at
some time before the child's birth, for one continuous year. Under
§ 1409(a), however, the foreign-born child of a United States citizen-father
becomes a citizen, retroactive to her date of birth, only if there is clear and
convincing evidence of paternity; the father consents in writing to provide
financial support until the child attains majority; and there is formal
acknowledgment of paternity during the child's minority, either by
legitimation, adjudication, or the father's written acknowledgment of
paternity, signed under oath. Moreover, the father must satisfy a residency
requirement significantly more onerous than that imposed on mothers.
Section 1409(a), the statute at issue in Nguyen, facially
discriminates against men by imposing additional burdens on unmarried
citizen-fathers who wish to transmit their citizenship to their foreign-born
are easier to find than fathers and are usually in the position of physical responsibility for a
newborn, most states distinguish mothers from fathers in conferring decision-making
authority over adoptions. In opposing such laws, formal equality advocates before the
Supreme Court have generally minimized their context by assuming that parental roles are
simply one more instantiation of oppressive gender stereotypes, the relief of which would
tend to the general good. Family law practices that have afforded unwed mothers of
newborns more decision-making authority in adoptions than unwed fathers have done so in
response to the very practical situations surrounding routine newborn adoptions. In almost
every newborn adoption case, the mother is the immediate custodial parent under
circumstances that have forced her, willingly or not, to take responsibility for thinking about
the newborn's future. The father may in fact also be thinking about the newborn's future, but
nothing in biology, culture or law requires his participation.")
41 The pitfalls of both biological essentialism and overhasty formalism are
discussed in Part III.B. Nevertheless, following Miller, scholars were nearly unanimous in
their opinion that § 1409(a) violated equal protection and that the Court would so decide
were they to apply heightened scrutiny. See, e.g, Cornelia T. L. Pillard & Alexander
Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision
Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 18 (1998) ("Five Justices in Miller
apparently believed that § 309(a) would not survive heightened scrutiny. Under modern
equal protection doctrine, those five Justices plainly had the better view. Section 309(a)
impermissibly uses sex as an inexact proxy for other attributes of unwed parents, fosters
stereotypes that 'reflect and reinforce historical patterns of discrimination,' and eschews sex-
neutral standards that could serve the government's purposes as well or better. The statute is
a virtual issue-spotter of equal protection defects.").
42 8 U.S.C. 1409(c), § 309(c).
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children. The provision is at first blush an ironic inversion of tradition in
this country and many others; historically, citizenship generally passed
through the father. The dissent in Nguyen implicitly acknowledges that
given the allocation of power, political and social, in the United States, no
congressionally enacted law is likely to truly disadvantage men.43 An
explanation for how § 1409(a) came to be passed is therefore crucial to
understanding the powerful gender stereotypes at play in Nguyen.
In the United States, citizenship is premised on the feudal concept
ofjus soli;44 any child born on United States soil is a citizen, irrespective of
the citizenship of her parents. Jus soli is to be distinguished from the
conferral of citizenship through birth to a citizen-parent, known as jus
sanguinis,45 common in civil law countries. The adoption of jus soli in the
United States reflects a notable departure from a tradition that confers most
privileges on the basis of blood, and particularly of the blood of the father.46
The indiscriminate conferral of citizenship on all persons born in the United
States neatly avoids the problem of sex.47
However, the Fourteenth Amendment, the only constitutional
provision to elaborate rules of citizenship, 48 does not stop atjus soli. Rather,
it encompasses "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States ' 49-
and with respect to naturalization, the Constitution vests the power "[to]
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization" in Congress. 50  The
43 Justice O'Connor never actually represents the statute as an instance of
discrimination against men. Rather, she would invalidate § 1409(a) on the basis that it
perpetuates stereotypes concerning natural parenting roles. Interestingly, she addresses
discrimination against men only in so far as they, too, are stereotyped: "Indeed, the
majority's discussion may itself simply reflect the stereotype of male irresponsibility that is
no more a basis for the validity of the classification than are stereotypes about the
'traditional' behavior patterns of women." Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 94 (2001)
(O'Connor, J. dissenting).
44 Meaning, "right of the soil."
45 Meaning, "right of blood."
46 In this respect, citizenship through jus soli offers an interesting counterpoint to
laws surrounding birth status, discussed below, which informs citizenship only in the context
of naturalization. See discussion infra part III.A.
47 Arguably, this is not entirely accurate. In so far as a mother, barring physical and
economic restraint, may choose to leave (or, if she is a United States citizen, enter) the
country to give birth, she is uniquely privileged to determine the citizenship of her child.
48 See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702-04 (1898). The
Constitution does not mention immigration. Louis Henkin, The Constitution As Compact
and As Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 11,
12(1985).
49 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
50 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. This provision is the origin of the plenary power
doctrine, a problematic body of law that several scholars expected the Court to overrule in
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naturalization of children born abroad entailed consideration of the
citizenship of the parents, and Congress, relying on traditional principles of
jus sanguinis, characteristically channeled citizenship through the father.5
In 1934, Congress promulgated an immigration act that allowed
citizen-mothers, for the first time, to confer citizenship on their children.
52
Six years later, Congress made what appears to be a radical change of
course with respect to parental privileges. The Nationality Act of 1940"3
distinguished between foreign-born children born to a married United States
Nguyen. The Court has repeatedly held that the Constitution authorizes broad congressional
discretion with respect to creating laws of citizenship and naturalization. In the infamous
Chinese Exclusion Case, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889), the
Supreme Court upheld the denial of re-entry to a Chinese laborer, despite his possession of
authorizing documents, who had temporarily left the United States. Congress's unfettered
discretion to alter immigration policy at will was "too clearly within the essential attributes
of sovereignty to be seriously contested." Id. at 607. The Court has been straightforward
regarding its authorization of congressional discrimination, most prominently quotas, in the
immigration context. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) ("In the exercise of its broad
power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens." Id. at 79-80). Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in
both Miller and Nguyen on the basis that Congress's plenary immigration power rendered
the case non-justiciable. In their dissent to Miller, Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
argued that jus sanguinis citizenship exceeds the boundaries of the plenary power doctrine.
In Nguyen, the plenary power issue was relegated to a one paragraph concurring opinion.
The doctrine may nevertheless have influenced the majority's willingness to sanction facial
discrimination. It should be noted that the phrase "any person" in the Fourteenth Amendment
does extend to aliens. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
51 Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 104 ("And the children of citizens of the
United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be
considered as natural born citizens: Provided, That the right of citizenship shall not descend
to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the United States.") See also 7 Charles
Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure § 93.04(2)(b) (1998). The conveyance of
citizenship jus sanguinis through the father is a natural outcrop of coverture, the common
law doctrine governing parental rights and responsibilities. Coverture imparted to fathers full
legal rights and responsibilities for marital children; nonmarital children, conversely, had no
claim on their fathers' property or support. Legislators and courts imported these principles
of coverture wholesale to the citizenship context. See generally Kristin Collins, Note, When
Fathers' Rights are Mothers' Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright,
109 Yale. L.J. 1669 (2000).
52 Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, 48 Stat. 797. The Act amended § 1993 of the
Revised Statutes to read: "Any child hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the
United States, whose father or mother or both at the time of the birth of such child is a
citizen of the United States ... ; but the rights of citizenship shall not descend to any such
child unless the citizen father or citizen mother ... has resided in the United States previous
to the birth of such child. In cases where one of the parents is an alien, the right of
citizenship shall not descend unless the child comes to the United States and resides therein
for at least five years continuously immediately previous to his eighteenth birthday, and
unless, within six months after the child's twenty-first birthday, he or she shall take an oath
of allegiance to the United States of America...."
53 Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137.
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citizen and those born outside of wedlock. s4 Children born abroad to
unmarried citizen-mothers were automatically entitled to citizenship. They
acquired the United States citizenship of their unmarried fathers, however,
only "provided the paternity is established during minority, by legitimation,
or adjudication of a competent court." 55
The 1940 Act, in an unprecedented celebration of maternal rights,
espouses a preference for mothers over fathers. There was, however, a more
sinister tendency at work in immigration law. Foreign-born children of
married parents had long taken on the citizenship of their fathers. Neither
the 1791 statute nor the common law differentiated between marital and
non-marital children. Cynically speaking, there was no compelling reason
to do so. Given that men bore no legal responsibility for the care of their
non-marital children, imparting citizenship to such children would not have
adversely affected their fathers' financial interests; 56 a father who conceived
an unwanted child abroad ran no real danger of being saddled with her care,
even if she were to be admitted to the United States. At the same time,
unmarried citizen-mothers had insufficient political power to secure
citizenship for their children, and married mothers accepted the citizenship
and domicile of their husbands for themselves as well as their children.
Against a backdrop of coverture and the preservation of the autonomy of
"unwilling" fathers, the apparent burdening of a father's rights vis-A-vis the
enactment of the 1940 Act becomes less anomalous. Mothers have always
borne responsibility for the care of their non-marital children. The purpose
of differential treatment in early immigration legislation was not to reward
mothers for their biological and social labors. Rather, like coverture, the
1940 Act served to protect men from unwanted burdens of childcare and
support for their non-marital offspring.57
5 The 1940 Act is the first to distinguish between marital and non-marital children
in the context of citizenship. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420,465 (1998).
55 Nationality Act of 1940 § 205, 54 Stat. at 1139. In 1953, Congress replaced the
1940 Act with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163,
but the relevant law was essentially unaffected (children of citizen-mothers were henceforth
assured citizenship even in cases where paternity had been established). See Miller v.
Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 467-78 (1998).
56 Arguably, the government had an interest in excluding illegitimate children, who
were in some cases entitled to state support. Nevertheless, such concerns were apparently
insufficient to warrant amendment of the immigration laws.
57 Kristin Collins neatly sums up the argument: "The history of coverture and the
transmission of American citizenship brings an elementary point into focus: The allocation
of parental rights is always correlated with the allocation of parental responsibility. This
basic legal truism, and its numerous implications for citizenship law, suggests that the
principal gender injustice caused by § 1409 is not its truncation of fathers' rights, but its
creation and perpetuation of a legal regime in which mothers assume full responsibility for
foreign-born nonmarital children. Once we recognize this gendered operation of § 1409,




Prior to Nguyen, two prominent Supreme Court cases dealt
explicitly with the constitutionality of differentiating between foreign-born
children for the purposes of citizenship on the basis of the sex of a child's
citizen-parent. In 1977, in Fiallo v. Bell,58 the Court upheld an immigration
statute that prohibited unmarried fathers from petitioning for their foreign-
born children to become lawful permanent residents,5 9 validating the
congressional perception of an "absence of close family ties" 60 between
fathers and their children. 61 Apparently rethinking the severity of the rule,
Congress subsequently enacted legislation allowing fathers to petition for
their children's permanent resident status-as long as they can demonstrate
a "bona fide parent-child relationship. 6 2 Unsurprisingly, no similar
restrictions apply to mothers.
More recently, the Court considered the very statute at issue in
Nguyen. Its 1998 decision in Miller v. Albright generated more confusion
and disagreement than resolution.63 With respect to the question of whether
§ 1409(a) violates equal protection as applied to the federal government
through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Miller failed to
produce a majority. Two Justices deemed the statute constitutional with
respect to both parent and child.64 Two Justices deemed the statute
constitutional with respect to children, but did not consider potential
discrimination against citizen-fathers. 65 Another two declined to consider
either claim, on the basis that the Court would in any case be unable to
confer citizenship as a remedy.66 Finally, three Justices concluded that the
58 430 U.S. 787 (1987).
'9 INA §§ 101(b)(1)(D), 101(b)(2) (1952).
60 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799.
6' Fiallo was the first Supreme Court case involving sex-based discrimination in
immigration. Although the Court generally applies heightened scrutiny to sex-based equal
protection claims, the Court in Fiallo declined to do so. Nevertheless, it introduced a new
standard, according to which the government must offer a "facially legitimate and bona fide
reason" for sex-based classifications in immigration. Id. at 794-95. This standard, though
minimal, is higher than the complete deference the Court had shown in previous
discrimination cases in the immigration context. Lower courts have applied the standard with
varying degrees of rigor. See Debra L. Satinoff, Sex-Based Discrimination in U.S.
Immigration Law: The High Court's Lost Opportunity to Bridge the Gap Between What We
Say and What We Do, 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 1353, 1359-60 & nn. 31 & 32 (1998).
62 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(b)(1)(D) (1999).
63 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
64 See id. at 432-445.
65 Id. at 451-452 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Miller's father had abandoned his
equal protection challenge and was no longer a party, and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
felt that Miller did not have third-party standing to raise her father's claims. Id. at 445-451.
66 Id. at 452-459 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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statute is unconstitutional.67 In Miller, the Court passed up the opportunity
to prohibit sex discrimination in immigration law. Neither, however, did it
expressly validate the statutory discrimination against citizen-fathers.68 The
coup de grdce would come two years later, in Nguyen v. INS.
I. NGUYEN V. INS
Nguyen v. INS upholds one of the last remaining facially
discriminatory federal policies. And yet, as the foregoing overview of
similar equal protection cases suggests, the decision was in many ways a
predictable one. The reasonings of the various opinions in Nguyen have
implications for both sex-based discrimination and representations of
sexuality and sexual power. This section seeks to explicate the majority and
dissenting opinions and suggests several potential lines of critique.
A. Nguyen's Story
Tuan Anh Nguyen was born in South Vietnam on September 11,
1969 to a Vietnamese mother, who abandoned him at birth. His father,
Joseph Boulais, was a United States citizen. After spending his early
childhood with his father's Vietnamese girlfriend, Nguyen arrived in the
United States as a refugee in 1975 at the age of five. He was raised in Texas
by his father, as a lawful permanent resident. In 1992, Nguyen pleaded
guilty to two felony charges of sexual assault on a child. The Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) initiated deportation proceedings against
him on the grounds that he had committed two crimes of moral turpitude
and an aggravated felony and was therefore, as an alien, deportable under 8
U.S.C. 1251 (a)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). The immigration judge held that Nguyen was
deportable.
Nguyen then filed an appeal with the Board of Immigration
Appeals. Meanwhile, Boulais obtained an "Order of Parentage," based on
positive DNA test results, in a Texas state court. Nevertheless, the Board of
Immigration Appeals found that the paternity order did not satisfy § 1409(a)
and dismissed the appeal. Nguyen and Boulais appealed the case to the
Fifth Circuit, which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in light of a statute
precluding appeal for an alien convicted of sexual assault.69 In Nguyen v.
67 Id. at 461-471 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 471-490 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
68 Immigration scholars perceived in Miller the unique opportunity to apply equal
protection to an alien plaintiff, were Miller successful, she would have attained retroactive
citizenship to birth and would therefore have been entitled to constitutional protections,
including heightened scrutiny of her sex-based discrimination claim. See Silbaugh, supra
note 12, at 1144-1145.
69 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)
§ 309(c)(4)(G), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-626 to 3009-627, precludes appeal "in
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INS,70 the Fifth Circuit considered Nguyen's citizenship as a "threshold
question" in deciding their jurisdiction. Although it understood the Order of
Parentage to definitively establish Boulais's paternity, it held that Boulais
had failed to comply with the procedural requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1409
prior to Nguyen's eighteenth birthday and that Nguyen was therefore
ineligible for citizenship. With respect to the equal protection challenge of
§ 1409(a), the court applied heightened scrutiny but nevertheless found that
the statute was "well tailored to meet the important governmental objectives
of encouraging healthy parent-child relationships while the child is a minor,
and fostering ties between the foreign born child [and] the United States,, 71
and was therefore constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
B. Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy, writing for a 5-4 majority, held that § 1409(a)71
served important governmental objectives through means substantially
the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable by reason of having committed"
specified criminal offenses.
70 208 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2000).
71 Id. at 535.
72 Section 1409(a) specifies that in order to assume the United States citizenship of
her father, a non-marital child must demonstrate that:
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is established
by clear and convincing evidence,
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the
person's birth,
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial
support for the person until the person reaches the age of 18 years, and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years --
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's residence or
domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under
oath, or
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a
competent court.
Title 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a). Moreover, the citizen-parent must meet the residency requirement
of § 1401(g). The Court noted that § 1409(a)(3), which was added in 1986, after Nguyen's
birth, was inapplicable to Nguyen. However, that provision is among the most problematic,
since the imposition of support obligations are more likely to deter use of § 1409(a) than
encourage it. See Pillard & Aleinikoff, supra note 41, at 23-24. Conversely, pursuant to
§ 1409 (c), the child of a citizen-mother bears a significantly lighter burden:
(c) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a) of this section, a
person born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out
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related to achievement of those objectives and was therefore consistent with
equal protection.73 In particular, he concluded, § 1409(a) furthers two
primary government objectives: "assuring that a biological parent-child
relationship exists,, 74 and
ensur[ing] that the child and the citizen parent have some
demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop not just a
relationship that is recognized, as a formal matter, by the law, but
one that consists of the real, everyday ties that provide a
connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the
United States.
75
With respect to the first objective, the measures of § 1409(a) are
unnecessary in the case of mothers, for whom maternity is verifiable at the
moment of birth and is generally documented in a birth certificate or
hospital records.76 No similar mechanism is available for fathers, however;
of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of
his mother, if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the
time of such person's birth, and if the mother had previously been
physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions
for a continuous period of one year.
Title 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c).
73 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 58 (2001). Although the Court applied heightened
scrutiny, it did not foreclose the possibility that Congress's plenary powers obviated elevated
scrutiny in the case. See id. at 61 ("Given that determination [that § 1409(a) survives
heightened scrutiny], we need not decide whether some lesser degree of scrutiny pertains
because the statute implicates Congress's immigration and naturalization power."). The
opinion suggests that equal protection analysis may in fact compel the statute in that citizen-
mothers have the right to reenter the United States for childbirth, whereas citizen-fathers
cannot determine the place of birth; precluding citizen-mothers from conferring citizenship
on their children would penalize those mothers who chose not to or were unable to return to
the United States for delivery. The majority also noted that a facially neutral rule premised
on establishing parentage within a specified time period would face the same challenges as
the present policy, which simply uses "gender specific terms" that "mark a permissible
distinction." Id. at 64.
74 Id. at 62.
75 Id. at 64. The Court admits that Boulais may not have been aware of the
requirements of § 1409(a). The result is that those fathers and children who have the least
access to legal resources will be denied the very father-child relationship that Congress is
purportedly so eager to facilitate. The majority also stresses that were it not for his crime
Nguyen could have applied for citizenship on a substantial ties theory, and as a practical
matter probably would have succeeded. Following her defeat in Miller v. Albright, Miller
pursued precisely that course and was awarded United States citizenship.
76 Id. at 82. The dissent noted the ease with which such documents can be forged.
See discussion infra Part II.C. Kif Augustine-Adams comments: "[T]he degree to which
hospital records and birth certificates 'typically establish' the blood relationship between a
mother and a child is culturally dependent and may not be as reliable for establishing the
required blood relationship as Stevens suggests, even in the United States. Birth certificates
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a father need not be present at birth, and even his presence does not prove
paternity.77 Fathers and mothers are therefore not "similarly situated" to
prove biological parenthood. The majority acknowledged that DNA testing
is an accurate method of establishing paternity, but noted that § 1409(a)
does not and need not require genetic testing. 78 Congress's failure to require
similar verification of parentage for mothers, for whom such "proof ... is
inherent in birth itself,"79 is "unremarkable."' In any case, the burden of
complying with § 1409(a) is minimal.8'
If the majority appears strained in its justification of harsher
requirements for demonstrating biological paternity, its rationalization of
the second objective--ensuring a "real, everyday" parent-child
relationship-essentializes parent-child relationships in a manner that has
astounded many commentators. For a citizen-mother, the majority reasoned,
"the opportunity for a meaningful relationship between citizen-parent and
child inheres in the very event of birth, an event so often critical to our
constitutional and statutory understandings of citizenship., 82 Given a line of
sex-based equal protection cases making stereotype an impermissible basis
for discrimination, the Court was precluded from simply validating the
classification as rewarding naturally nurturing mothers.8 3 The majority
are notoriously easy to forge or obtain fraudulently. My own anecdotal experience with birth
registrations in Mexico suggests that (1) parents may delay a child's official registration until
they can travel to a home village to effectuate the registration there, (2) children may be
officially registered as having been born to relatives, where the relatives are in a better
financial position with access to health care for dependents, and (3) the inefficiencies of a
system where relatively large numbers of women give birth outside of hospitals allow for
multiple registrations of the same child. Whether a mother is a U.S. citizen or not, registering
a child's birth in many parts of the world is a tentative rather than conclusive venture."
Gendered States: A Comparative Construction of Citizenship and Nation, 41 Va. J. Int'l L.
93, 107-08 (2000). See also Pillard & Aleinikoff, supra note 41, at 27 ("Recent studies show
that one-third of all births abroad occur without birth certificates. That reality, especially
when coupled with the increased incidence of adoptions from abroad, suggests a need for
proof of maternity by U.S.-citizen putative mothers before the children they assert they bore
overseas are recognized asjus sanguinis U.S. citizens.").
77 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62.
71 Id. at 63.
79 Id. at 64.
80 Id. at 64.
si Id. at 70. The dissent noted: "Even assuming that the burden is minimal (and the
question whether the hurdle is 'unnecessary' is quite different in kind from the question
whether it is burdensome), it is well settled that 'the 'absence of an insurmountable barrier'
will not redeem an otherwise unconstitutionally discriminatory law."' Id. at 93-94.
82 Id. at 65.
83 The majority specifically addressed the allegation of stereotyping: "There is
nothing irrational or improper in the recognition that at the moment of birth-a critical event
in the statutory scheme and in the whole tradition of citizenship law-the mother's
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therefore turned to the notion of opportunity. Since a mother is inherently
present at birth, she inevitably enjoys the physical opportunity of forging a
maternal relationship with her child (whether or not she avails herself of
this opportunity is apparently irrelevant). A father, on the other hand, does
not naturally share that opportunity-he may not even know he is a
father 4-and he must therefore demonstrate that he has sought some
opportunity for a meaningful relationship with his child. The majority
stressed, with a note of urgency, that:
Congress is well within its authority in refusing, absent proof of
at least the opportunity for the development of a relationship
between citizen parent and child, to commit this country to
embracing a child as a citizen entitled as of birth to the full
protection of the United States, to the absolute right to enter its
borders, and to full participation in the political process.
5
Practically speaking, of course, § 1409(a) requires more than an opportunity
for a relationship. By requiring the father to formalize paternity, the statute
is likely to affect primarily those fathers who have participated actively in
their children's lives.
Ultimately, the majority premised its validation of § 1409(a) on the
notion of biological difference. To Justice Kennedy, § 1409(a) does not
embody a "gender-based stereotype," because it "addresses an undeniable
difference in the circumstance of the parents at the time a child is born. 86
The Court went so far as to celebrate its own recognition of difference as
promoting equal protection by separating the "real" differences from the
"real" stereotypes:
To fail to acknowledge even our most basic biological
differences-such as the fact that a mother must be present at
knowledge of the child and the fact of parenthood have been established in a way not
guaranteed in the case of the unwed father. This is not a stereotype." Id. at 68.
84 Id. at 66-67 ("Indeed, especially in light of the number of Americans who take
short sojourns abroad, the prospect that a father might not even know of the conception is a
realistic possibility .... Without an initial point of contact with the child by a father who
knows the child is his own, there is no opportunity for father and child to begin a
relationship. Section 1409 takes the unremarkable step of ensuring that such an opportunity,
inherent in the event of birth as to the mother-child relationship, exists between father and
child before citizenship is conferred upon the latter."). Moreover, the mother herself may not
know who the father is. In this context, Justice Kennedy devoted substantial attention to the
children of United States military personnel, citing Department of Defense Statistics
indicating that a disproportionate number of active military personnel are men. Id. at 66-67.
Additionally, he cites the high numbers of American visitors to foreign countries,
particularly Canada and Mexico. Id. at 67.
85 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 67.
86 Id. at 68.
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birth but the father need not be-risks making the guarantee of
equal protection superficial, and so disserving it. Mechanistic
classification of all our differences as stereotypes would operate
87to obscure those misconceptions and prejudices that are real.
For the majority, biological difference justifies different results.
C. Dissent
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor, writing for Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, rejected the notion that sex-based stereotypes
premised on childbearing are innocuous and necessary. She did not disavow
physical differences altogether. Rather, she argued that "[s]ex-based
statutes, even when accurately reflecting the way most men or women
behave, deny individuals opportunity"88-the very buzzword on which the
majority relied. Sex-based generalizations entrench "fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females,"89 and they are
therefore impermissible.
Unlike the majority, which required only that the government
demonstrate that § 1409(a) was substantially related to the achievement of
an important governmental interest, the dissent would have imposed the
higher intermediate scrutiny applied in Virginia.90 Under that standard, the
government would have needed to offer an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for the sex-based classification in § 1409(a). 91 On this basis,
the dissent rejected both of the government's purported justifications for the
discriminatory policy. With respect to biological proof, the dissent
criticized the ill fit between the means and end,92 noting that genetic testing
87 Id. at 73.
88 Id. at 74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
89 Id. at 74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)).
9' The dissent criticizes the majority for its departure from its prior application of
heightened scrutiny: "In all, the majority opinion represents far less than the rigorous
application of heightened scrutiny that our precedents require." Id. at 79.
91 Id. In all likelihood, however, at least three Justices would have found that
§ 1409(a) violated even the lesser standard applied by the majority.
92 The dissent criticized the majority for its dismissal of sex-neutral alternatives on
the mere basis that they, too, would result in disparate impact. "In our prior cases, the
existence of comparable or superior sex-neutral alternatives has been a powerful reason to
reject a sex-based classification.... The majority, however, turns this principle on its head by
denigrating as 'hollow' the very neutrality that the law requires.... While the majority
trumpets the availability of superior sex-neutral alternatives as confirmation of
§ 1409(a)(4)'s validity, our precedents demonstrate that this fact is a decided strike against
the law. Far from being 'hollow,' the avoidance of gratuitous sex-based distinctions is the
hallmark of equal protection." Id. at 82. While the majority was right to note that mothers
would more easily satisfy a sex-neutral proof of parentage requirement, facially neutral laws
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and other non-discriminatory means would in any case be more effective.93
As for creating an opportunity for a meaningful relationship, the dissent
concluded that the majority had failed to demonstrate that Congress had any
such intent, and stressed that hypothesized rationales are insufficient under
heightened scrutiny.
94
The dissent considered both of the majority's stated "important
governmental objectives" at length.95 The basic criticism of the dissent,
however, transcends either argument taken individually; simply put, the
majority has failed to apply its ordinary scrutiny and instead exhibited
excessive deference in upholding facially discriminatory and dangerous
distinctions on the basis of sex. For example, Justice O'Connor noted the
superfluous nature of the Court's primary justification: the importance of
assuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists. 96 In light of DNA
testing and other accurate means of ensuring a biological relationship, the
procedural hurdles imposed on fathers by virtue of gender are far from
narrowly tailored.97 The poor fit of the government's stated purpose is
further exemplified by the statutory option of establishing a "biological
relationship" through an oath of patemity-a telling departure from
do not trigger heightened scrutiny and are different in kind from facially discriminatory ones.
Id.
93 Id. at 80. See also id. at 81 ("Because § 1409(a)(4) adds little to the work that
§ 1409(a)(1) does on its own, it is difficult to say that § 1409(a)(4) 'substantially furthers' an
important governmental interest." (citation omitted)).
94 1d. at 84.
95 Id. at 79-91.
96 The dissent noted that the requirements of § 1409(a)(1) are largely superfluous
in light of § 1409(a)(1)'s requirement that a father demonstrate a blood relationship with his
child: "The gravest defect in the Court's reliance on this interest, however, is the
insufficiency of the fit between § 1409(a)(4)'s discriminatory means and the asserted end ....
[Section] 1409(a)(1), which petitioners do not challenge before this Court, requires that 'a
blood relationship between the person and the father [be] established by clear and convincing
evidence.' ... It is difficult to see what § 1409(a)(4) accomplishes in furtherance of 'assuring
that a biological parent-child relationship exists' that § 1409(a)(1) does not achieve on its
own. The virtual certainty of a biological link that modem DNA testing affords reinforces
the sufficiency of § 1409(a)(1)." Id. at 80 (citation omitted). See also id. ("It is also difficult
to see how § 1409(a)(4)'s limitation of the time allowed for obtaining proof of paternity
substantially furthers the assurance of a blood relationship. Modem DNA testing, in addition
to providing accuracy unmatched by other methods of establishing a biological link,
essentially negates the evidentiary significance of the passage of time. Moreover, the
application of § 1409(a)(1)'s 'clear and convincing evidence' requirement can account for
any effect that the passage of time has on the quality of the evidence.").
97 The dissent criticized the majority for dismissing alternative means of
establishing a biological relationship. See id. at 81-82 ("The majority concedes that Congress
could achieve the goal of assuring a biological parent-child relationship in a sex-neutral
fashion, but then, in a surprising turn, dismisses the availability of sex-neutral alternatives as
irrelevant.") (internal citations omitted).
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biology, given the Court's subsequent insistence that a purported father may
himself not know who the actual father is.98
Similarly, the dissent criticized the majority's emphasis on a
mother's "opportunity" to form a meaningful relationship with her child.
Had the Court pointed to actual relationships between mothers and
children, they would have invoked cultural stereotypes and generalizations.
By relying on opportunity, they were able to couch their decision in
biological difference, thereby avoiding a debate over means-ends fit. While
perhaps effective for those purposes, the tactic served to denigrate the
importance of fostering parent-child bonds: "[i]t is difficult to see how, in
this citizenship-conferral context, anyone profits from a 'demonstrated
opportunity' for a relationship in the absence of the fruition of an actual
tie." 99 Moreover, the facts of Nguyen confirmed the possibility that a father
and child would have the opportunity to develop a relationship and would in
fact do so without formalizing their relationship pursuant to § 1409(a).'0 0
In the end, according to the dissent's reading of Nguyen, the
government and the majority both fall back on impermissible sex
stereotyping. The majority's attempt to disclaim that impulse fails, the
dissent argued, because it "articulate[s] a misshapen notion of 'stereotype'
and its significance in ... equal protection jurisprudence."'' The majority
defined "stereotype" as "a frame of mind resulting from irrational or
uncritical analysis."' 2 Such a narrow definition, according to the dissent,
ignores the long line of cases holding that stereotypes may be empirically
98 See id. at 81 ("Satisfaction of § 1409(a)(4) by a written acknowledgment of
paternity under oath ... would seem to do little, if anything, to advance the assurance of a
blood relationship, further stretching the means-end fit in this context.").
99 Id. at 84 ("If a child grows up in a foreign country without any postbirth contact
with the citizen parent, then the child's never-realized 'opportunity' for a relationship with
the citizen seems singularly irrelevant to the appropriateness of granting citizenship to that
child. Likewise, where there is an actual relationship, it is the actual relationship that does all
the work in rendering appropriate a grant of citizenship, regardless of when and how the
opportunity for that relationship arose."). The dissent noted that the majority never
sufficiently responded to this critique, stating only that "[i]t is almost axiomatic that a policy
which seeks to foster the opportunity for meaningful parent-child bonds to develop has a
close and substantial bearing on the governmental interest in the actual formation of that
bond." Id. at 55. In the minds of the dissenting Justices, "[a] bare assertion of what is
allegedly 'almost axiomatic' . . . is no substitute for the 'demanding' burden of justification
borne by the defender of the classification." Id. at 87.
100 Id. at 85. The facts of Nguyen are not uncommon. The petitioners' brief
reported, "according to 1998 Census data, in the United States more than 700,000 never-
married fathers are raising more than a million children." Brief for Petitioners at 16 n.6,
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071) (citing Lynne M. Casper & Ken Bryson,
U.S. Census Bureau, Household and Family Characteristics 108 (1998); Terry A. Lugaila,
U.S. Census Bureau, Marital Status and Living Arrangements iii (1998)).
101 Nguven, 533 U.S. at 89.
102 Id. at 68.
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grounded and thus in some sense "rational." The Court rejects even
arguably rational generalizations when they "classify unnecessarily and
overbroadly by gender when more accurate and impartial functional lines
can be drawn.' ' 3
The dissenting opinion concludes with a historical account of the
discriminatory intent of the legislation at issue in Nguyen. Section 1409(a)
was first enacted as § 205 of the Nationality Act of 1940, upon the
recommendation of a Committee of Advisors. Their recommendations
unabashedly rely on mothers' natural roles as caretaker and guardian:
[T]he Department of State has, at least since 1912, uniformly
held that an illegitimate child born abroad of an American mother
acquires at birth the nationality of the mother, in the absence of
legitimation or adjudication establishing the paternity of the
child. This ruling is based ... on the ground that the mother in
such case stands in the place of the father.... [U]nder American
law the mother has a right to custody and control of such child as
against the putative father, and is bound to maintain it as its
natural guardian. This rule seems to be in accord with the old
Roman law and with the laws of Spain and France.
104
Section 1409(a) is the product of a long history of relegating women to the
home, as caregivers. As early as 1932, the call for sex-neutral citizenship
law was premised on the notion that "when it comes to the illegitimate
child, which is a great burden, then the mother is the only recognized
parent, and the father is put safely in the background."'0 5 In upholding
§ 1409(a), the dissent suggests, the Court lent its authority to a policy
premised on a history of stereotype and subordination.
The dissent's analysis is fairly persuasive as a matter of precedent.
As noted above, discriminatory classifications in the context of employment
or schooling, even where premised on biological difference, are regularly
invalidated. 10 6 Moreover, several family law statutes closely related to
§ 1409(a) with respect to the rights of non-marital children to paternal
privileges have been held to violate equal protection. And, of course, the
103 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 460 (1998) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
'04Ng yen, 533 U.S. at 91-92 (quoting To Revise and Codify the Nationality Laws
of the United States, Hearings on H.R. 6127 Before the House Committee on Immigration
and Naturalization, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 431 (1945) (reprinting Message from the
President, Nationality Laws of the United States (1938)) (emphasis added and internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
10 Id. at 92 (quoting Naturalization and Citizenship Status of Certain Children of
Mothers Who Are Citizens of the United States, Hearing on H.R. 5489 before the House
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (testimony of
Burnita Shelton Matthews)).
106 See discussion supra part I.A.
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standard constitutional critiques apply. The rule is both overinclusive and
underinclusive, in so far as children who are abandoned by their citizen-
mothers at birth are entitled to seek citizenship decades later, whereas those
who are raised from birth by citizen-fathers who never formalize their
caregiving relationships may be subject to deportation once they reach
adulthood.
D. Some Comments on the Decision
What is particularly striking about the majority's opinion is the
ideological inconsistency that drives it. The Court succumbed to precisely
the conflation of "real" biological difference (whatever that entails) and the
social programming that it cautioned against. By couching its validation of
Congress's advancement of the nurturing mother in the language of
"opportunity," the majority purported to abandon stereotype. It claimed to
have done no more than recognize a biological reality: women are
inevitably present at birth, men are not. It is the coloring of this distinction,
however, that relegates a recognition of difference to the entrenchment of
an outmoded ideal of the mothering role. While it is no doubt true, as the
dissent pointed out, that more biological mothers than fathers are present at
the birth of their children,' °7 that fact carries no physical significance for
subsequent parent-child relationships. And while it may be the case that
empirically more mothers do forge such relationships10 8 -an assumption
107 Of course, innovations in in vitro fertilization, surrogacy, and other new
techniques may mean that the egg donor is not present at birth. A case challenging the statute
on these grounds is unlikely to arise. Nevertheless, it seems that the Court would be
analytically bound to exclude such mothers, and their children, from the coverage of
§ 1409(c)--even if they were in fact present at birth.
log See, e.g, Silbaugh, supra note 12, at 1152-53 ("With various degrees of comfort
or reluctance, many in the family law field have come to the conclusion that the intensity of
maternal commitment is, on average, greater than paternal commitment, and more
significantly, that variation is far less common among mothers than among fathers. Thus,
although it is difficult to speak broadly about the role of a father, in candid moments it is far
easier to generalize about certain aspects of motherhood, particularly default responsibility
for childrearing should shared parenting fail, and intense emotional involvement with
children."). Cf Collins, supra note 51, at 1704 ("The legal default rule that mothers assume
parental responsibility for non-marital children generally serves as the 'reasonable' or
'substantial' justification for a concomitant allocation of parental rights: One sex-based legal
rule is used to justify another. The result of such circular reasoning in Miller, as in other
equal protection cases involving the regulation of parenting and reproduction, is that
parenting-related statutes are insulated from the searching judicial scrutiny that the modern
equal protection doctrine purports to offer. As a consequence, equal protection analysis itself
obfuscates the gender-based harms that result from such laws. A second, related problem is
that by promoting a search for sex-based stereotypes (for example, that women tend to
assume responsibility for nonmarital children), the current approach fails to detect the
coercive nature of the default allocation of parental responsibility.").
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that must have been the true, if unstated, basis for the Court's decision-
that relationship is far from inevitable, as the facts of Nguye illustrate.'0 9
Nevertheless, as several family law scholars have emphasized in the
wake of Miller and Ngen, the alternative approach of ignoring the reality
that mothers are likely to be burdened with the responsibilities of
childrearing is by no means immune from criticism. In some sense, Justice
Kennedy's concluding statements on stereotype are true: a legal espousal of
formal equality cannot write away such patent physical differences as which
sex bears a child. On the contrary, the failure to recognize such differences
as sex-based leads to decisions, like Geduldig," that systematically
overlook women's needs and interests, as well as to skepticism (among
leftists and conservatives in equal measure, if for different reasons) that sex-
based equal protection is working. In the context of family law, a statute
conferring equal privileges on a biological father who had assumed no
responsibility for his children years after their birth would be received with
outrage by feminists and traditionalists alike. And while formalized legal
status would remain a problematic proxy for parental involvement, the
imprecision would likely be accepted in the interest of administrative
convenience.
Katharine Silbaugh criticizes the dissent, as well as the
organizations advocating invalidation of § 1409(a)-most prominently the
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, which represented Nguyen, and
the American Civil Liberties Union, which filed an amicus brief in Miller-
for their simplification of the discrimination engendered by the statute. By
reducing a policy premised on family relationships to one about gender
roles, Silbaugh argues, practitioners and scholars have characteristically
ignored family law concerns."' She cites the prevalence of putative father
registries and other practical measures that facilitate adoption at the expense
109 The petitioner's brief noted: "Ironically, though Boulais supported his child,
because he undertook that obligation freely as a parent and without any formal written
promise, he fails to meet the requirements of Section 1409(a)(3). A citizen mother is not
formally required to provide such support; if Nguyen's mother had been the U.S. citizen
instead of his father, then Nguyen would be a citizen, even though his mother took no part in
his upbringing. The reason for the distinction lies in stereotype: the stereotype that a
connection is automatically established between mothers and their children but not fathers
and their children, and the stereotype that men, not women, are sole providers for their
families." Brief of Petitioners at 19-20, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071).
110 417 U.S. 484 (1974). See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
111 Silbaugh, supra note 12, at 1154-55. She writes of the ACLU brief that it
"speaks of the roles of mothers and fathers in an almost cartoonish way. The picture painted
is of a very modem world in which gendered parenting roles are no longer the norm, in
which all that can be said of parenting is that it is too heterogeneous to make any gendered
claims. The ACLU cites data on women's increased participation in the workforce,
apparently expecting the Court to assume that this increased participation must have brought
with it role reversals in the home. This may accurately reflect parenting in the popular
imagination, but it is not supported by empirical evidence." Id.
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of fathers' rights'1 2 as evidence that "family law scholars and policymakers
usually have preferred reforms that facilitate speedy adoptions and reflect
gender fairness ... to reforms that put fathers and mothers on an identical
footing but may slow the process of newborn adoptions."
'
" 13
There is, however, a central difference between putative father
registries and the statute at issue in Nguye; namely, the invalidation of
§ 1409(a) would have benefited not only absentee fathers, but also the
children of those fathers' 4 and their struggling single mothers." 5 The
112 While the Court has not addressed these questions in depth, it is not unaware of
the family law precedent. In Miller, the majority reasoned, "Our conclusion that Congress
may require an affirmative act by unmarried fathers and their children, but not mothers and
their children, is directly supported by our decision in Lehr v. Robertson.... Whereas the
putative father in Lehr was deprived of certain rights because he failed to take some
affirmative step within about two years of the child's birth (when the adoption proceeding
took place), here the unfavorable gender-based treatment was attributable to Mr. Miller's
failure to take appropriate action within 21 years of petitioner's birth and petitioner's own
failure to obtain a paternity adjudication by a 'competent court' before she turned 18." Miller
v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 441 (1998).
13 Silbaugh, supra note 12, at 1156. There may ultimately be a need for a middle
ground between Silbaugh's acceptance of the legitimacy of practical considerations and the
equal protection notion that administrative convenience is never a permissible justification
for state discrimination. The reality, in any case, is that cases like Miller and Nguven simply
do not pose the same administrative concerns that putative father registries do, because the
interests at stake in the latter are not children's interests, but rather state interests in
restricting citizenship and therefore economic investment in alien children, and more
immediately fathers' interests in assuming responsibility only for those children for whom
they elect to care.
114 Another irony of the decision, though it may be necessitated by the Court's
decision on standing in Miller, is that the Court focuses on the rights of the parent to the
exclusion of the interest of the child. This is a blatant departure from the best interests of the
child standard that characterizes family law within this country. By presupposing that these
children are not U.S. citizens, the Court is able to dispense with a consideration of their
interests altogether. A district court deemed the Nationality Act of 1940 invalid in LeBrun v.
Thornburgh, on the basis that the Act "served to make the citizenship of children born out of
wedlock to American fathers, particularly those serving in the armed forces, subject to the
personal vagaries and consciences of their fathers." 777 F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (1991). Judge
Sarokin commented: "Those who have no choice in the marital state of their parents should
not be so penalized or stigmatized, and their rights to citizenship should not be dependent on
the moral fortitude (or lack thereof) of one of their parents. The unfairness is exacerbated by
placing such power solely in the hands of the male parent. The law was thus discriminatory
in its impact upon children born out of wedlock and sexist in making citizenship dependent
upon the acquiescence of the male parent only." Id.
1"5 Cornelia Pillard and Alexander Aleinikoff note that although § 1409(a)(4)(c)
(section 309(a)(4)(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act) formally permits a non-citizen
child to initiate a paternity action during her minority, whereby she would be entitled to
citizenship, the provision is essentially hollow: "As a practical matter, [a father's] decision
will virtually always be definitive. In order to override his preference, a child overseas (or
her foreign mother on her behalf) would have to know about the statute, and specifically
about her opportunity under § 309(a)(4)(C), to get a court adjudication, locate the correct
state court in the United States, hire a lawyer, and file and win an involuntary paternity
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children of unmarried citizen-fathers are twice penalized by the
irresponsibility the Court is so eager to tout." 6 The sting of § 1409(a)'s
exclusion is particularly harsh for those children born in developing
countries, who grow up in poverty, without the financial or emotional
support of their fathers.
Why was Nguyen decided as it was? The most palpable difference
between this case and other equal protection decisions, including those
involving non-marital children, is that N is about immigration and
citizenship. The majority appeared convinced of the legitimacy of its appeal
to biological difference. There is no doubt, however, that the Court's
decision was largely a practical one as well. Although Justice Kennedy
purported to decide this case on the basis of heightened scrutiny, the
plenary powers doctrine loomed in the background.' 17 Moreover, at least
two Justices were concerned that the Court could not proscribe a remedy
even were they to find § 1409(a) unconstitutional," 8 since they cannot
confer citizenship on terms other than those specified by Congress." 1
9
The decision is practical in another sense as well. Whatever one's
feelings on United States immigration policy and this country's
responsibility with respect to international poverty, it must be admitted that
action. If she managed to get that far, she would still have to satisfy Section 309(a)(3)'s
financial-support prong. It is not at all clear that a child-support order would count as
'agree[ing] in writing to provide financial support' under the statute, but even if it did, the
child would face similar logistical obstacles to obtaining such an order. And the nonmarital
child abroad might have no substantive right to support from a U.S. father if, for example,
the law of the place of birth applied and conferred no such right, and if the relevant U.S.
domestic law did not apply extraterritorially." Cornelia T. L. Pillard & Alexander Aleinikoff,
Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in
Miller v. Albright, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 23 (1998).
116 Arguably, in the case of children born to mothers raped by U.S. military
personnel in developing countries, the United States is responsible for yet broader social and
political injustice.
"17 The dissent distinguished Fiallo, which rejected a constitutional challenge to a
sex-based immigration classification, on the basis that "[t]he instant case is not about the
admission of aliens but instead concerns the logically prior question whether an individual is
a citizen in the first place. A predicate for application of the deference commanded by Fiallo
is that the individuals concerned be aliens. But whether that predicate obtains is the very
matter at issue in this case." Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 96 (2001).
118 Justices Scalia and Thomas felt that the case was non-justiciable on this basis.
119 The dissent argued that severance of § 1409(a)(4) would have been an
appropriate remedy, given that the INA contains a general severability clause, § 406, 66 Stat.
281 ("If any particular provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision
to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby."). While the dissent rightly
attacked the majority for subordinating equality to practical considerations of administrative
expediency (in a way that precedent had explicitly proscribed), their high ground is unsteady.
The petitioners, as we shall see, have made their own sacrifices to expediency and
practicality.
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the national welfare coffers, at the current level of funding, cannot
accommodate a flood of immigrant children.120 Given that the dissent
quarreled with the narrow tailoring element of heightened equal protection
scrutiny more than the compelling governmental interest prong, the
majority devoted the bulk of its discussion to biological difference. That
tactical decision is unfortunate in so far as it sidetracks a potentially
revealing discussion of the distributive effects of § 1409(a).
Taken together, the majority and dissenting opinions in Nguyen
bring to mind three potential statutory schemes, with very different
distributive ramifications. The first, § 1409(a) itself, has the obvious
"advantage" of excluding thousands of children who might otherwise have
access to United States resources. The second, espoused by neither the
majority nor the dissent, would ensure citizenship to all children, wherever
born, of at least one United States citizen. Realistically speaking, it is
unclear whether even such a generous statute would have a pronounced
effect, given that many potentially eligible children would be unable to
identify or locate their fathers -2 1 -it seems likely that few of the affected
mothers would have thought to take down the names (properly spelled) and
social security numbers of their lovers, or would in any case have the will
or resources to locate them. Nevertheless, the dissent understandably shied
away from such a broad rewriting of the statute. Instead, the dissent offered
what is ironically the most restrictive proposal of the three: procedural
requirements regarding proof of parentage and/or a real social relationship,
prior to a child's attaining majority, regardless of the sex of the citizen-
parent. While this option would eliminate sex stereotyping, it would in fact
increase the number of children vulnerable, like Nguyen, to a denial of
citizenship on technical grounds despite close ties with their citizen-parents
as well as to the United States. Before hastily adopting one of these options
in order to mitigate the effects of harmful symbolism, it is important to
recognize the economic and social costs of following any of these paths.
120 Section 1409(a)(3), enacted in 1986 and therefore inapplicable to Nguyen,
addresses this issue directly. In Miller, the Government explained that the purpose of the
clause is "to facilitate the enforcement of a child support order and, thus, lessen the chance
that the child could become a financial burden to the states." Brief for Respondent at 25-26,
n.13, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071) (quoting Hearings on H.R. 4823 et
al. before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 150 (1986) (statement of Joan M. Clark,
Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs)). Justice Stevens expressed concern in
Miller that allowing a man to claim citizenship for an adult child would encourage fraudulent
claims, since he would not be responsible for child support. A genetic testing requirement
would obviate this concern. Nevertheless, this critique applies theoretically even to those
children not covered by § 1409(a)(3), including Lorelyn Miller (as well as Nguyen), since a
citizen-father will be responsible for supporting his citizen-child regardless of whether he
has agreed to do so.
121 Presumably, even such a relaxed statute would require proof of parentage.
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Ultimately, however, the purpose of this Article is not to engage in
the debate between majority and dissent over symbolism and stereotype,
nor to solve the distributive dilemma outlined above. Rather, the pages that
follow explore what is entirely missing from the majority, the dissent, and
academic criticism: the sex that underlies the statute and Nguyen's story
alike.
III. SEX, SEXUALITY: WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE?
There appears to be something approaching consensus among
scholars that as an equal protection decision, Nuen is wrongly decided.
At the same time, however, it is clear that § 1409(a) is more than a garden-
variety sex-based classification. The INA, in regulating when a non-marital
child is entitled to United States citizenship, is saying something powerful
about marriage itself. Non-marital children are the products of non-marital
sex, and non-marital sex is the wrong kind of sex. The state has an interest
in dictating what kind of sex produces citizens. To date, equal protection
doctrine has had nothing to say whatsoever about sexual desire and sexual
freedoms. In the many family law cases debating the constitutionality of
abortion, birth control, putative father registries, child support obligations,
and countless other issues intertwined with sexuality, no judge has touched
upon what is really at stake in those decisions-the freedom to engage in
sexual acts without bearing the consequences. No one is eager to make the
argument that disproportionately burdening women's sex subordinates
women.
The notion that the state creates and regulates sexuality is by no
means a new one. In 1976, when Foucault criticized a generation of sex
liberationists for their conviction in "the sexual cause-the demand for
sexual freedom[,] the knowledge to be gained from sex and the right to
speak about it,' 22 he took for granted that the assumption of governmental
sexual repression was a widely held one. At the same time, there is a
prevalent sentiment that the modem state, despite a pretense of
liberalization, is if anything more pervasive in its regulation of sexuality:
"Although the movement toward self-conscious sexuality has been hailed
by modernists as liberatory, it is important to remember that sexuality in
contemporary times is not simply released or free-floating.... States now
organize many of the reproductive relations that were once embedded in
smaller scale contexts.' 23 This Article takes no position in that debate
except to assume-problematically but without knowing where or how else
122 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1: An Introduction 6
(Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books ed., 1990) (1976).
123 Ellen Ross & Rayna Rapp, Sex and Society: A Research Note from Social
History and Anthropology, in Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality 51, 68 (Ann
Snitow et al. eds., 1985).
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to ground a legal critique-that laws do in fact instantiate governmental
power by influencing people's behavior.
This Part begins by examining the consequences of regulating sex,
domestically and abroad. It then inquires into the inadequacy of equal
protection doctrine to accommodate discussion of sexual difference and
sexuality more generally. Finally, it asks whether the limitations of equal
protection doctrine account for the absence of sexuality from the Court's
decision, or whether there are more pervasive, normative, political, or
jurisprudential forces at work. It should be noted at the outset that the
following discussion assumes that most unmarried non-citizen mothers, and
particularly those who live in developing countries, lack the knowledge,
law, skills, and resources of the United States to effectively bring paternity
actions and thereby force paternal responsibility.
2 4
A. What's Sex Got to Do With It?
The suggestion that sex is conspicuously missing from the equal
protection discussion of Nguyen and § 1409(a) presumes that the statute
does indeed regulate sex, whether explicitly and intentionally or as a
byproduct of other concerns. The preceding section noted that § 1409(a),
despite its ideological shortcomings, has practical advantages, from the
perspective of administrative efficiency, in restricting access to social
resources. However, the statute has a distinct set of costs unrelated to
economic considerations. This section demonstrates the ways in which
§ 1409(a) influences sexual freedom, with markedly different results for
women than men.
25
Should sex be rich, personal, and deeply relational? Or is "casual
sex" an element of adult play that should be liberated and celebrated?
Although I do not purport to answer those questions here, they are bound up
with the regulation of sex under § 1409(a). For reasons that are elaborated
in the following pages, § 1409(a) encourages women to have sex with their
husbands and men to have sex however and with whomever they please. In
fact, the implicit sexual incentive scheme built into § 1409(a) may be why
feminists who share little else share an intuitive distaste for the statute.
From a family law relational perspective, § 1409(a) is reprehensible
because it sanctions men's sexual irresponsibility and allows men to
objectify women by compelling them to bear the costs of sex. From the
124 See supra note 115.
125 While my approach is not explicitly constructivist, the following discussion
presupposes that by imposing different (harsher) consequences on women's sex than men's
sex, § 1409(a) at least contributes to the representation of women's sexuality as intrinsically
different from men's. The equal protection question at stake in Nguven is therefore more
pervasive than "gender" roles regarding parenting; it penetrates to the core of sex identity. It
is also interesting to note that only sex that produces children is at issue-ironically, gay and
lesbian sex appears to be entirely free of regulation by this provision.
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"sex-positive" perspective of those who seek to redeem sex for its own
sake, § 1409(a) is destructive of sexual freedom in so far as, by burdening
women disproportionately with the consequences of non-marital sex, it
dissuades women from having sex and entrenches a power disparity that
precludes truly casual sex. In short, § 1409(a) unabashedly, if perhaps
unintentionally, establishes a scheme of sex-discriminatory sexual
incentives and regulations.
However anomalous the sexual repercussions of § 1409(a) may
seem, they are well-precedented. State regulation of sexuality in the
nineteenth century manifested itself early on in laws prohibiting fornication,
adultery, sodomy, incest, seduction, and rape; later additions included
prohibitions on obscenity and lewdness, interracial sex, cohabitation and
marriage, prostitution, and eventually homosexuality. 126 Although each of
these traditional means of explicitly regulating sexuality bears some
significance with respect to the legislative scheme at stake in Nglye, the
most relevant is that classic device of regulating sexual relationships by
regulating their products (children): regulation of birth status. 127 In fact,
N bears a striking resemblance to a line of equal protection cases
prohibiting discrimination against non-marital children. Like § 1409(a),
state laws releasing fathers from financial obligations with respect to their
non-marital children may have been tailored more to the protection of
financial resources than to the regulation of sexuality. But for those laws, as
for § 1409(a), the effects on sexuality were palpable and power-laden.
1. Social Underpinnings
The second half of this section traces the unsteady progress of
litigation aimed at ending birth status discrimination and seeks to
understand § 1409(a) as a manifestation, if not a straightforward
appropriation and exportation, of many of the principles underlying birth
status laws. However, the social norms underlying both § 1409(a) and birth
status regulation are as important as their legal history and are the subject of
this subsection.
At first blush, Justice O'Connor's assessment that the precursor to
§ 1409(a) was designed to protect men's wealth, names, and family
pedigrees 28 seems plausible. But there is more to the story than simply the
protection of fathers. To begin with, whatever the historical origins of
§ 1409(a), it may be disingenuous to ascribe to Congress that kind of
126 See generally William N. Eskridge & Nan D. Hunter, Sexuality, Gender and the
Law 1-2 (1997).
127 Given the distasteful and weighted connotations of the term "illegitimate," I
will generally use the term "non-marital" rather than "illegitimate" and "birth status" rather
than "legitimacy" or "illegitimacy."
128 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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conscious manipulation of immigration law to protect paternal autonomy.
Justice Kennedy convincingly set forward a number of sex-neutral
justifications for the policy. 29 Moreover, if shielding fathers from unwanted
responsibility were the only purpose of § 1409(a), Boulais should have been
permitted to petition for his son's citizenship whenever he chose to do so.
Rather than establish a set of tedious administrative procedures and a statute
of limitations, Congress could just as easily have permitted fathers to confer
citizenship on their children, at their discretion, whenever they chose to do
SO.
Part of the equation, no doubt, is a brand of class discrimination
endemic to the U.S. immigration scheme. The fathers least likely to avail
themselves of § 1409(a) during their children's minority are those who have
the fewest resources and are inattentive to legal "technicalities."' 3 °
Similarly, national financial incentives to exclude as many children as
possible must have been central.' But the normative power of § 1409(a)
penetrates deeper into social consciousness, channeling a history of state-
sponsored sexual activity. Birth status laws enable the state to regulate
sexual relationships and pressure women into heterosexual marriages. If
they are to protect their children-an expectation that is of course already
socially conditioned-women are forced to accede to the sexual
relationships that the state and their fathers have authorized. Moreover,
sexual subordination theory would tell us that the government has an
interest in sanctioning the sexual vagaries of its male as well as its female
citizens; a "mothering" father is just as subversive as a failed mother. A
man is not a father until he seeks the legitimization of the state.
Ellen Ross and Rayna Rapp have noted that the Bastardy Clauses
of England's 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act in England, which assigned
sole financial responsibility for non-marital children to mothers and their
129 See discussion supra Part I.B.
130 There is an element of racial discrimination in the immigration scheme as well.
As Kif Augustine-Adams explains, "The exclusion of U.S. servicemen's children born
abroad and out-of-wedlock results in a distinct physical embodiment of the nation. Under the
current citizenship rule, the U.S. citizen population is whiter than it would be under a rule
that granted U.S. citizenship at birth to both the children of unmarried U.S. citizen women
and unmarried U.S. citizen men. As Justice Stevens notes, the overwhelming majority of
U.S. service people abroad are and have been men. Over the past few decades, these U.S.
servicemen have left behind children in countries with populations of color: Vietnam, the
Philippines, Japan, Korea, and other Southeast Asian countries. Moreover, minorities of
color are represented in the U.S. military at a greater percentage than in the U.S. population
generally. Thus, the children excluded under the current rule are most often children of color,
through their mother, their father, or both. The practical impact of the rule excluding from
the United States children born abroad to unmarried U.S. men is a raced citizenry, a nation
without the children of color that belong to its unmarried fathers abroad." Augustine-Adams,
supra note 76, at 112-113.
131 See discussion supra Part ll.D.
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,,132parishes, provided men a "new license to avoid marriage. As a result,
"an earlier tradition of lively female sexual assertiveness ... gave way to a
more prudish, cautious image of womanhood by the 1860s.' ' 3 In keeping
with a historical tendency to preserve men's assets and freedom, § 1409(a)
releases men from responsibility for child support in the international
setting, thereby facilitating men's sexual freedom and constraining
women's sexual choices.
But § 1409(a) is in some sense far more effective and less
contentious than its predecessors. As notions of social welfare and
community responsibility for the poor gained sway in this country, the costs
of preserving the autonomy of unwitting fathers fell increasingly on the
state. Many unmarried mothers were simply unable to provide for their
children, and state institutions increasingly intervened. Cynically speaking,
the recognition of the high social costs of birth status laws may have been
more influential than sympathy for mothers and children in changing the
discriminatory regime. Unlike its predecessors, § 1409(a) neatly avoids the
costs associated with domestic birth status law-by exporting them. To be
sure, the state remains responsible for supporting indigent children of
citizen-mothers, a duty to which everyone has become accustomed. 134 The
truly innovative and unique advantage of § 1409(a) is that citizen-fathers
can protect their assets without threatening domestic coffers. Women,
whether American or foreign, would do well to refrain from non-marital,
possibly procreative sex with American men unless they are willing to risk
the burdens of parenthood. 35 Men's sex, on the other hand, is entirely free
of consequences in almost all cases.
The proposition that § 1409(a) implicates sexual norms has ample
support in the statute. Regulation of sexual activity is not foreign to the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1940, even if the particular breed of
sexual regulation at stake in N was an unintended consequence.
Section 316(a) of the Act makes naturalization contingent on "good moral
character" for five years prior to an application for citizenship.136 Section
101(0(3) excludes from that definition people engaged in prostitution,
polygamy, and moral turpitude, among other factors. Explicit prohibition of
sexual practices such as fornication, adultery, and private homosexual
132 Ross & Rapp, supra note 123, at 51.
133 Id.
134 The burden of supporting the children of unmarried mothers is still unlikely to
fall entirely on the state, since culture charges mothers with the care of their children to the
extent possible.
135 This argument obviously presupposes a lack of access to reliable birth control
and abortion. While this is likely to be the case for women in developing countries, the
argument may be more vulnerable in the context of citizen-mothers.
136 8 U.S.C § 1427(a).
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conduct were specifically disallowed in a number of jurisdictions, 3 7 and by
the 1970s, the INS had retreated from its earlier moral hard line. A
provision prohibiting adultery was repealed in 1981.138 Unsurprisingly, the
less palpable regulation of sexuality vis-A-vis birth status managed to
survive.
2. Litigating Legitimacy
Although 8 U.S.C. § 1401 provides that children of married citizen-
fathers are automatically entitled to United States citizenship, the Court in
Nguyen did not consider the equal protection claim that § 1409(a)
discriminated impermissibly on the basis of birth status. 139 In many ways,
the decision to abandon the birth status claim was an unfortunate one. A
Supreme Court holding on the basis of birth status would have obviated the
biological reasoning that rationalized the sex-based classification. Even had
it considered birth status, however, the Court would not have reached the
issue of sexuality for the reasons set out below.
a. Birth Status and Equal Protection Doctrine
Today, birth-status claims receive a level of judicial scrutiny
somewhere between rational basis review 140 and the intermediate scrutiny
traditionally afforded sex-based discrimination claims.' 4' To survive equal
protection scrutiny, a birth status classification must be "substantially
related to an important governmental objective."'' 42 The Court's central
motivation for heightened scrutiny appears to be that birth status is
137 See, e.g., Marie Posusta v. United States, 285 F.2d 533 (2nd Cir. 1961).
131 U.S.C. § 1101[f][2], repealed by Public Law No. 97-116, § 2(c)(1), 95 Stat.
1611 (1981).
139 The petitioners did not in fact make such a claim, probably owing to the
standing problem in Miller. In Miller, the Court did not grant certiorari on the claim of birth
status discrimination. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 422 (1998).
140 Recall that in Fiallo v. Bell the Court declined to apply intermediate scrutiny to
a provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act that discriminated against the
illegitimate children of citizen-fathers on the basis of the plenary power doctrine. The Court
also cited the "perceived absence in most cases of close family ties" between unmarried
fathers and their children, as well as obstacles to proving paternity. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787 (1987).
141 See Karen A. Hauser, Inheritance Rights for Extramarital Children: New
Science Plus Old Intermediate Scrutiny Add Up to the Need for Change, 65 U. Cin. L. Rev.
891 (1997).
142 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). The "important governmental interest"
standard replaced the earlier standard, which required substantial relation to "permissible
state interests." Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 264 (1978).
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immutable and accidental; 143 children should not be disadvantaged because
of their parents' actions. Intrusion of such classifications on family privacy
rights has been an additional, albeit lesser, consideration.
There is a long history in this country of discriminating against
children born to unmarried parents. At common law, a non-marital child
was nulliusfillius (nobody's child). The father had no legal duty to support
children born outside of marriage, and such children, at least formally, were
barred from inheriting from either parent. 144 The harshest of these rules
were gradually mitigated by legislation in many states. 45 However, the
principle of coverture, which dictated that only marital children acquired
status patrilineally, lasted well into the twentieth century. Fathers of non-
marital children had neither rights nor responsibilities.
1 46
The Court first considered an equal protection challenge to birth-
status classification in 1968, in Levy v. Louisiana. 47 Noting that the Court
had been "extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights and ha[d]
not hesitated to strike down an invidious classification even though it had
history and tradition on its side,"'148 the majority invalidated a wrongful
death statute that denied recovery to non-marital children after their
mother's death. Since then, the Court has generally been hostile to birth-
status classifications, 149 though the outcome and the standard of review to
143 See Hauser, supra note 141, at 899.
'4 Collins, supra note 51, at n. 64
145 Linda Kelly notes that the award of custody to mothers, beginning in the early
nineteenth century, was also a result of the protection of male interests through coverture.
Linda Kelly, Essay, The Alienation of Fathers, 6 Mich. J. Race & L. 181, 185 (2000)
("While social demands and the transformed image of women allowed women to be viewed
as the primary caretakers and awarded women custody as the number of custody disputes
grew with the growing number of cases of separation and divorce, illegitimate children were
also affected. In keeping with the changing gender roles, women could now also be
recognized as the 'natural' caretakers of illegitimate children.... Fathers, on the other hand,
would be charged with the financial expectation of keeping their illegitimate children off the
public dole.").
146 The father could, however, choose to adopt his non-marital children. See
Collins, supra note 51, at n.64
147 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
1481d. at 71.
149 See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (applying heightened
scrutiny to strike down an intestate succession law precluding illegitimate children from
inheriting from their fathers); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (holding that
adoption laws could not unequivocally dispense with paternal consent to the adoption of
illegitimate children). But see Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 357 (1979) (applying
rational basis scrutiny to uphold wrongful death statute that precluded fathers from suing for
the wrongful death of their illegitimate children). Arguably, Parham disadvantages only the
father of an illegitimate child, not the child herself.
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be applied in any given case are far from predictable.' 50 However, as with
discrimination against fathers, many distinctions remain in state family law.
In 1988, the Court decided Clark v. Jeter,' 5 ' which struck down as
violative of the Equal Protection Clause a statute that is similar in many
ways to § 1409(a). Clark, on behalf of her daughter, challenged a
Pennsylvania statute that foreclosed a non-marital child from seeking
paternal support unless paternity was established within six years of her
birth. The Court reasoned that marital children were not subject to similar
time limitations, and the statute therefore impermissibly discriminated on
the basis of birth status. The parallels to Nguyen are striking. Whereas the
child of a married citizen-father is automatically entitled to citizenship, a
non-marital child may not acquire the citizenship of her father barring the
fulfillment of certain proscribed requirements within the child's minority. 52
There is, however, a notable distinction between the two cases. In light of
the Court's refusal to entertain the equal protection claim of the would-be
citizen-child in Miller v. Albright, NMen was, of necessity, framed as a
case of paternal rights. Whereas the government must offer rigorous
justification for discriminating against a non-marital child, the father's
irresponsibility apparently singles him out for special treatment.
53
b. Birth Status Unsexed
What is notable for the purposes of this Article is that none of the
rights recognized by the courts in the birth status context-neither child's
rights nor father's rights, nor, by implication, mother's "right" to not be
stereotyped-implicates sexuality. The sexual undercurrent of the birth
status laws has largely been lost as a result of the equal protection strategy
that sought to abolish them. The limitations of equal protection doctrine
with respect to violations of sexual freedoms are the subject of the next
section. For now, it is enough to note that in so far as equal protection is
about suspect exercises of governmental power (a promising beginning), it
is about suspect classifications, not suspect ideologies and normative
goals.5 4 Non-marital children, like women, may be entitled to constitutional
150 See, e.g, Homer Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States 860
(2nd ed. 1988) ("It is difficult if not impossible to arrive at an accurate or useful assessment
of the Supreme Court's decisions.").
'5' 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
152 The difference in allotted time for fulfilling those requirements-six years in
Clark v. Jeter versus eighteen years in Nguyen v. INS-is arguably a compelling distinction
between the two cases. However, the fact that no similar limitations attend to married fathers
remains.
153 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
154 The production of suspect classifications is in any case already corrupted. See
Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation
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protection, but sexual regulation has no place in equal protection
jurisprudence.155
The Court's analysis in the birth status cases has never recognized a
mother's choice to have sex out of wedlock, nor in fact has it ever touched
upon sexuality at all except to emphasize that a child should not be
punished for the sexual impropriety of her parents. In Levy, the first birth
status case decided by the Supreme Court, there is little room left for a sex-
based claim; after all, "[t]he rights asserted here involve the intimate,
familial relationship between a child and his own mother."'1 6 Even as
recently as 1988, in Clark v. Jeter, the Court reasoned within the context of
two principles of birth status cases: the practical concession that "it might
be appropriate to treat illegitimate children differently in the support context
because of 'lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity," 57 and the
more philosophical notion that "visiting ... condemnation on the head of an
infant is illogical and unjust.',' 58 Whatever the moral deficiencies of the
parents' choices, their children should not be penalized for those failings.
To be fair, there are many good reasons for the Court's failure to
consider the ramifications of the birth status cases on women's (set against
men's) sexual rights. First and foremost, there is little incentive to do so-
the heightened scrutiny (often) applied to birth status cases, while premised
on resistance to outmoded moralistic notions, is the same standard that
(usually) applies in sex discrimination cases. Moreover, arguing on behalf
of wronged children who played no role in the violation of laws and social
norms is intuitively and analytically more compelling. The Court's
summation in Trimble v. Gordon 59 rings true: "The parents have the ability
to conform their conduct to societal norms, but their illegitimate children
of Sex from Gender, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1995). Franke suggests that the process of
classification reflects social allocation of power rather than natural characteristics. In
particular, she argues that "every sexual biological fact is meaningful only within a gendered
frame of reference." Id. at 98.
155 By this rationale, perhaps Nguyen might have been decided as a privacy/sexual
autonomy case. However, the Court has made clear that the government is not required to
facilitate choices about sexuality and procreation. It is simply constrained with respect to its
power to proscribe certain decisions and activities.
156 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1962). In the same case, the Court is so
sweeping in its liberalism to quote from King Lear: "We can say with Shakespeare: 'Why
bastard, wherefore base? When my dimensions are as well compact, My mind as generous,
and my shape as true, As honest madam's issue? Why brand they us With base? with
baseness? bastardy? base, base?' King Lear, Act I, Scene 2." Id. at 72. Although I do not
here endeavor to provide a textual exegesis of the passage, the classical American notion of
self-determination and autonomy sound loudly.
157 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
158 Id.
"9 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
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can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status.' 60 Thirdly, if
these cases were to be decided on the basis of parents' rather than children's
rights, courts would want a broader basis than sex discrimination.
Otherwise, states could permissibly penalize both parents. Given the
declining success of due process claims in recent years, departing from
generally accepted principles of equal protection in order to create a new
and sweeping due process right to fornication is an unlikely alternative.
Nevertheless, it should be recognized that these measures were
unnecessary precisely because citizen-children do have legal rights. Given
the increasing prevalence and tolerance of single parent families in all
communities, it seems likely that neither popular sentiment nor, by
extension, the Court would today tolerate invidious discrimination against
the children of unmarried parents, even if such discrimination were
constitutionally permissible. A number of commentators have noted that the
Court would have come under substantial attack had it upheld a domestic
statute of the sort at stake in Nguyen.' 61 Implicit assumptions about sexual
freedom surely play some role in scholarly aversion to this statute and
others like it.
B. Unequally Protected Sex
The previous section demonstrates the importance of the sex-
regulative undertones of § 1409(a). Whatever the implications of the statute
with respect to stereotyping and gender roles-and it is at least arguable
that the symbolic costs of sex-based differences with an administrative
loophole, while real, may be overcome by practical considerations-it is
clear that another set of costs has been overlooked. The following section
attempts to explain why. It first explores the doctrinal inadequacies of equal
protection with respect to sex-based, and more specifically, sexually based
differences. It then looks beyond equal protection law to the broader social,
political, and jurisprudential norms that prevent consideration of sexual
costs in legal analysis.
Over the past decades, feminist legal scholars have been struggling
to formulate a strategy for targeting sex-based discrimination that both
dispels gender stereotypes and is sensitive to women's unique concerns,
particularly those surrounding pregnancy and childbirth, which the law has
consistently undervalued. In practice, the competing goals have created a
bifurcation of feminist legal camps: one promoting what has come to be
known as "formal equality," the other urging "anti-subordination theory,"
defined as the recognition of women's differences through different legal
160 Id. at 770.
161 But see Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979), supra note 149.
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treatment.16 Today, even as reductionist notions of sexual subordination
have lost their grip on feminist scholarship, anti-subordination theory seems
to hold the favored place among legal academics. Advocates of formal
equality are rightly criticized for their inattentiveness to power disparities
and social conditions that would preclude women from taking advantage of
purportedly equal opportunities.163 Anti-subordination theory, however, is
difficult to implement pursuant to equal protection doctrine, and the courts
continue to rely largely on formal equality.' 64
Strictly speaking, there is little room in equal protection doctrine
for accommodation of difference. In some sense, anti-subordination theory
tortures a doctrine that was never meant to equalize results and is ill-
equipped to do so. And while it allows for more flexibility than does formal
equality,1 65 it has its own attendant problems. Most patently, it allows
discrimination against men, 66 which is problematic from an anti-
subordination perspective because men, as a class, do not comprise a
historical target of subordination. Although it is possible to reach a result
that targets discrimination against men on the basis that it indirectly
subordinates women, 67 doing so inevitably entails unpopular and often
attenuated modes of reasoning.
Moreover, the specter of "real" difference is always in the
backdrop, particularly with respect to discrimination involving sexuality or
its repercussions, and neither theory offers much in the way of a solution.
68
162 See, e.g., Clay M. West, Nguyen v. INS: Case Note: Is Sex Really More
Important Now? 19 Yale. L. & Pol'y Rev. 525, 526 (2001).
163 See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 32, at 406 ("The second problem with the formal
equality model is that it ignores power. Discrimination against men really is not the same
evil as discrimination against women, and one would say the same as to 'reverse
discrimination' against whites, for example. In both examples, the core of the problem is not
the absence of abstract equality but the presence of subordinating systems of power. Anti-
subordination theory speaks to this: sex discrimination not only classifies, it subordinates a
class.").
164 But see Mary Anne Case, The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns:
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 Comell L. Rev.
1447 (2000) (arguing that despite its fall from favor, formal equality has the advantage of
avoiding the separate-but-equal approach engendered by anti-subordination theory).
165 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (mandating proactive
accommodation on the part of the government).
'66 Discrimination against men is of course at stake, at least superficially, in
Nguyen.
167 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Additionally, gays and lesbians are
entirely unprotected by sex-based equal protection--despite efforts to cast gay marriage as
discrimination against men, as opposed to women, who wish to marry men, and vice versa.
168 There is of course some overlap between the two categories. The most obvious
cases are same-sex education, the military, prison guards, and other fora in which institutions
claim that sexuality per se must be a consideration-which are often argued on that basis that
men will be unable to contain their sexual aggression and impulses.
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Formal equality is of no help whatsoever with respect to purely sexual
differences (of either category), where men and women are simply not
"equal." A court is always entitled to find that a given law subordinates a
subset of women, like pregnant women or mothers, rather than women as a
class. 169 For instance, it makes no sense to speak of abortion law as
discrimination against women in formal equality terms, since neither
women nor men are entitled to abortions. Anti-subordination theory fares
slightly better--conceptually, at least, it demands equal results, meaning
that women's unique sexual concerns cannot be wholly neglected.
Moreover, since anti-subordination theory looks to the underlying social
forces and messages at work in a law, it precludes legislation that ostensibly
advantages women but reinforces negative cultural associations.
As the law stands, however, a statute that limits women's sexual
choices by targeting the consequences (pregnancy, childrearing) borne by a
subset of women as a consequence of those choices is unlikely to trigger
heightened scrutiny. One potential solution, defining sexual autonomy as an
equal protection fundamental right, is unlikely to materialize, if the courts'
decisions on gay rights are any indication. The only alternative, from an
advocacy standpoint, is to argue on the basis of subordination vis- -vis sex
stereotyping. Even so, it remains quite a stretch to claim that legislation
disadvantaging only mothers, or even potential mothers, triggers sex-based
equal protection scrutiny at all-and discrimination against a subset of
women would be subject only to rational basis review.
This is precisely the problem encountered in Nguyen. Though the
dissent argues that § 1409(a), in so far as it perpetuates stereotypes about
motherhood and outmoded notions of matrilineage of illegitimate children,
violates equal protection, it is easy for the majority to fall back on
biological difference. The Court's similar biological reasoning in Miller v.
Albright prompted a number of excellent critiques of that decision that
169 There are two principal areas where the notion of real difference is routinely
applied: (1) physical disparities with respect to traits shared by both sexes, such as height,
weight, or strength, and (2) sexual characteristics that typically affect only one sex, including
menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth, and sexual organs and their diseases. The latter category
can be further subdivided into traits shared by almost all members of a given sex (namely,
sexual organs, chromosomal configuration, and hormonal balances) as opposed to those
shared only by a subset-most frequently, fertile women, pregnant women, or mothers.
Presently available doctrine applies with varying degrees of acuity to the different
categories. The easiest case surrounds physical differences, such as height and strength, that
rarely implicate sexuality. Formal equality would allow an employer or educational
institution to discriminate on the basis of such traits without distinguishing between sexes: a
woman would be permitted to serve as a soldier, bouncer, or professional basketball player
alongside a man of equivalent size and strength. The limitations of formal equality are self-
evident, given the distribution of such traits across the sexes. Anti-subordination theory does
better, however, providing that reasonable accommodations should be made in areas in
which such characteristics can be supplemented by skill, intelligence, and other
compensatory factors.
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apply equally to Nguyen, and I do not wish to reproduce those discussions
here. 70 Nevertheless, highlighting the pitfalls of biological stereotyping will
facilitate an understanding of how the Court subordinated sexuality to a
representation of sex-based traits. By pointing to those "real" differences
between men and women like the fact that women sometimes become
pregnant and men never do, the majority neatly avoids the antecedent
question of how mothers become pregnant in the first place.
For Justice Kennedy, the case is settled on the basis of biological
necessity]7l'-unwed mothers cannot very well escape the opportunity of
forming the mother-child bond. Kif Augustine-Adams represents Justice
Stevens' similar differentiation in Miller of unmarried fathers and mothers
with respect to § 1409(a) as a distinction between "legal" fathers and
"natural" mothers. 172 Whereas motherhood is understood as a natural,
biological, and inescapable relationship, fatherhood is merely a legal status.
This analysis applies with equal acuity to the Court's decisions in the
"biology plus" cases.173 Even where biology explicitly favors the non-
marital partner of the mother, the mother's husband is the legal father. In
some sense, then, Nguyen v. INS embraces the very biologism that the
"biology plus" decisions have sought to overcome. By hinging the
presumption of a close parent-child relationship-which replaces mere
genetic heritage as the prerequisite of citizenship-on the sex of the citizen-
parent, the Court's decision privileges biology rather than actual social ties.
Building on Augustine-Adams's analysis, it becomes clear that the
"naturalization" of the mother and the legal reification of the father go hand
in hand. The formalistic tendency in constructing fatherhood reinscribes the
father as the locus of law. A married man has positively assumed legal
authority as the patriarch and therefore establishes himself as father of any
child born to his wife-as long as a woman remains married, she cannot
170 These studies include Collins, supra note 51; Pillard & Aleinikoff, supra note
41; and Kelly, supra note 145.
171 See discussion supra Part lI.B.
172 Kif Augustine-Adams, Gendered States: A Comparative Construction of
Citizenship and Nation. 41 Va. J. Int'l L. 93, 104 (2000) ("Thus, under the law upheld by
Stevens, the biological and natural process of siring a child does not make a man a father;
rather, fatherhood exists as a legally created construct. Men do not-indeed cannot-become
fathers until they comply with the legal indicators of fatherhood, despite their biological
connection with a child. Unmarried men choose to become fathers, in the legally relevant
sense, after siring a child by fulfilling the formal requirements of U.S. citizenship law. The
biological tie of fatherhood is not sufficient; what creates a father is a man's choice to
economically support a child and confer legitimacy. In contrast, an unmarried mother's
biological connection to her child is legally determinative. Under the law, she transmits
citizenship to her child at birth and thus embodies the nation. Under this reasoning,
fatherhood is legal and a matter of choice, whereas motherhood is natural and a matter of
biology.").
173 See discussion supra Part I.A.
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choose the father of her child. Her sexual acts are inseparable from her legal
status in so far as she will "mother" any child who is born to her. For her
husband, conversely, sexuality is largely divorced from law. Should he
choose to impregnate an unmarried woman, he may often walk away.
The father does not entrench himself as such until he takes an
affirmative legal action. 74 Mothers, conversely, are denied this formal
relationship to their children by virtue of their natural roles. The distinction
applies to unmarried women as well. A mother can change her status
through law only by choosing to rescind her motherhood-termination of
parental rights means becoming a not-mother. For unmarried men, on the
other hand, law surfaces only in the context of the conferral of father status.
That a woman can initiate a paternity action, at least in theory, does not
mitigate the identification of the father with the law. However, it does
create an ironic inversion. A woman who forces a man to become a father
against his will becomes a subject and object of law simultaneously. She
has chosen to bring the law down upon herself.1
7S
Struggling against this legal framework, the dissent suggests that
we should be looking beyond biology altogether, by introducing facially
sex-neutral citizenship requirements premised on actual parent-child ties
rather than opportunity. 7 6 However, premising citizenship on actual social
bonds, as the dissent seemingly advocates, would perpetuate the stereotype
of the nurturing mother and preserve men's autonomy-fathers could
continue to exclude their children from their lives and their country;
whereas mothers would continue to be culturally (though not legally)
compelled to assume the caregiving role.177 Moreover, one's ability to make
affirmative social choices is circumscribed by sex, wealth, race, and
countless other choices. It is naive to suggest that a non-citizen unmarried
mother living in a developing country has an opportunity commensurate
with that of the child's citizen-father to decide whether to form a social
174 The notable exception to this premise in United States law is the paternity
action, whereby a mother may obtain a court order declaring a man the legal father of her
child. On that basis, the court will proceed to impose child support obligations.
175 The concept becomes even more weighted in the context of immigration, where
father and fatherland jointly exercise their power.
176 Because even the dissent is apparently unwilling (to be fair, likely unable) to
prohibit Congress from excluding foreign-born children with no actual ties to the United
States, Justice O'Connor proposed that § 1409(a) might have permissibly been applied to
mothers as well as fathers. Alternatively, Congress could have employed one of "a number
of sex-neutral arrangements"--presumably such substitute criteria as DNA testing, presence
at birth, or, most likely, demonstration of a parent-child relationship. Nguyen v. INS, 533
U.S. 53, 80 (2001). Basing citizenship on the sex-neutral factors advocated by the dissent
would indeed have achieved formal equality, but at the price of shirking responsibility for
children of United States citizens who are irresponsibly left behind.
177 The dissent responded to this criticism, as raised by the majority, that the
resulting discrimination would pose only disparate impact concerns and would therefore not
trigger heightened scrutiny. Id. at 82.
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relationship with the child. On the one hand, she may be socially bound to
care for the child; on the other, she may be forced to surrender her child for
any variety of social, economic, familial, or religious reasons.
Ultimately, any decision premised on the notion of biological
difference or stereotyping of social roles faces the criticism that legal rules
are unlikely to impact cultural biases. In this case, even if the state were to
confer citizenship on all children born to one citizen-parent, cultural
conceptions of parenting roles would remain intact. Though such a rule
would have the practical advantage of preventing administrative oversights
like Nu~yen's, mothers would continue to bear a disproportionate burden
with respect to parental duties. Would a direct confrontation with sexuality
do any better? In terms of real results, perhaps not. Nevertheless, the latter
strategy expressly acknowledges that children are a result of sex. To the
extent that it emphasizes sexual choices over parenting choices, it combats
cultural stereotypes of the nurturing mother. Both partners, in an ideal case,
have chosen freely to engage in a sexual relationship; 7 8 they are equally
178 The premise that § 1409 creates incentives for women to refrain from sex
abroad assumed a backdrop of voluntary, consensual sex for pleasure. Unfortunately, in the
context of sex between U.S. citizen men and non-citizen women-and particularly of
military sex in developing countries, with which the Court is so concerned-that assumption
is unwarranted. See Nguven, 533 U.S. at 65 ("Given the 9-month interval between
conception and birth, it is not always certain that a father will know that a child was
conceived, nor is it always clear that even the mother will be sure of the father's identity....
One concern in this context has always been with young people, men for the most part, who
are on duty with the Armed Forces in foreign countries. See Department of Defense,
Selected Manpower Statistics 48, 74 (1999) (reporting that in 1969, the year in which
Nguyen was born, there were 3,458,072 active duty military personnel, 39,506 of whom
were female); Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics 29 (1970) (noting that
1,041,094 military personnel were stationed in foreign countries in 1969); Department of
Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics 49, 76 (1999) (reporting that in 1999 there were
1,385,703 active duty military personnel, 200,287 of whom were female); id., at 33 (noting
that 252,763 military personnel were stationed in foreign countries in 1999).").
A number of studies have documented the prevalence of rape, coercive sex, and
commercial sex between American servicemen and foreign women. Each of the three
categories, of course, poses unique concerns from the standpoint of sexual power
imbalances. For instance, while it is clear that the victims of rape are deprived of sexual
autonomy, a number of scholars have suggested that commercial sex may in fact empower
women. As a contract-skeptic, I am somewhat resistant to the latter notion. Regardless,
§ 1409(a) encourages coercive sexual practices, however defined, by casting men as sexually
dominant. If a child is produced, the father will be free to decide whether to take
responsibility and whether the child will have the right to become a citizen. Women, on the
other hand, will almost invariably be burdened with childcare. In the case of lengthier
relationships, a woman who has conceived a child, whether willingly or not, will feel
pressured to ingratiate herself with the child's father. As is so common in the case of
domestic abuse, pleasing her partner is likely to take a sexual form. What is particularly
ironic about Nguyen's story is that the deportation hearings that single him out as the product
of rogue sex were sparked by his own foray into sexual assault. It is perhaps poetic justice
that the very sexual abuse that caused Nguyen's predicament was tied up with the social
norms and resulting legal rules that excluded him from citizenship.
Protecting Sex
responsible for the consequences of that choice, whether or not they
actually discharge their parental responsibilities.
The foregoing discussion of the pitfalls of sex-based equal
protection in the face of biological difference begs the question whether
there is a principled basis for striking down § 1409(a) on the basis of sex.
Arguably, one could buttress the equal protection argument with the very
"sexuality" arguments that equal protection doctrine has consistently
excluded-after all, unlike discrimination against actual mothers (who are
given no choice as to their children's citizenship) or actual fathers (who
face unique administrative obstacles to conferring citizenship on their
children), disproportionately targeting sex by potential mothers
encompasses an overwhelming segment of the category "woman." Because
I am more interested in why related sexual arguments have not been made
and the consequences of that omission than in the details of their
construction, I leave such doctrinal proposals to one side.
C. The Bigger Picture (Two Tales of a Would-be Citizen)
The last section sought to address the question of why sex is
missing from a jurisprudential standpoint: equal protection doctrine simply
does not extend to implicit regulation of sexual choices. Nevertheless, the
limitations of existing legal doctrine, while relevant, seem inadequate to
explain the complete elision of sexuality from all legal challenges to birth
status laws. After all, given sufficiently compelling reasons, the Court
might have expanded equal protection doctrine or crafted alternative legal
bases for sexual rights-whether premised on the once-promising due
process right to procreate or on a novel theory. Doctrinal boundaries
ultimately seem too simple an answer.
This section asks whether there is something more at stake by
examining the regulatory interest of the state in downplaying sexuality and
sexual violence, as well as the incentive for legal reformists to advance
women's practical standing at the expense of ideological consistency. In
Nguyen's story, there are two acts of silencing that warrant consideration:
the erasure of Nguyen's sexual assault, and the erasure of sexuality from
legal and scholarly consideration of § 1409(a) in particular and sex
discrimination doctrine in general. In each case, there are two silences: the
silence of the state and dominant social forces (represented by the
respondent and the majority), and that of the forces purporting to challenge
and subvert government regulation (represented by the petitioners and the
dissent).
1. What Crime?
Given the United States's many incentives to exclude children of
non-citizen fathers, the underlying sexual politics of § 1409(a) may appear
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somewhat academic. Arguably, the Court has shied away from discussions
of sexuality because an examination of sexual disincentives from a sex-
discrimination perspective might jeopardize valuable governmental
programs and traditional spheres of governmental power. This subsection
therefore examines the Court's silence with respect to an inescapably sexual
act that the government, by all intuitive accounts, should seek to exploit.
In the context of § 1409(a), the events that led up to Nguyen v. INS
are probably somewhat anomalous. Lorelyn Miller's story is likely to be
more common; she had spent her childhood abroad with her mother and
wished to enter the United States and claim citizenship after she had
attained majority.17 9 And yet the fact that Tuan Anh Nguyen is by most
measures (including upbringing, schooling, and acculturation) an American
was central to the petitioners' strategy. Given the seemingly palpable
injustice of excluding a man who had spent the vast majority of his life in
this country, it is notable that the government did not explain its motivation
for excluding him in more detail. Nguyen, as it turns out, was a convicted
sex offender. He had pled guilty to two separate counts of sexual assault on
a child.
There are many other cases that might have come to the Court, and
one cannot rest too much on the fortuity that Nguyen's crime was sexual
assault. Nevertheless, I believe that the intersection of sexual assault and the
implicit regulation of sexuality bear strong descriptive power. Are the two
chapters of Nguyen's story incongruous? Both are stories of pain,
alienation, and helplessness. The hero of one is the villain of the other.
Analysis of the relationship between sex and sexuality in Nguyen v. INS
applies with equal force to cases in which sexual domination apparently
figures less prominently.
This subsection therefore explores whether the erasure of Nguyen's
crime has broader ramifications with respect to the silencing of sexuality. In
the interest of rhetorical impact, I would have liked to have begun this
endeavor with a narrative account of Nguyen's assault on a young child,
broken into an equally poignant story of a Vietnamese-American forced to
leave his home and father, and proceeded to highlight and explicate the
tensions between the two as manifestations of sexual and sex discrimination
in United States society. Unfortunately, that option was foreclosed to me;
the erasure of Nguyen's crime was so thorough that the details of his
conviction were completely omitted from all of the media, law review, and
judicial accounts of the proceedings. The joint appendix to the Supreme
Court case contains elaborate records of Boulais's birth and military service
and extensive documentation of Nguyen's paternity, but no description of
the assault.1 80 The petitioners' brief elides Nguyen's sexual transgressions,
179 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420,425 (1998).
180 The omission bears an ironic resemblance to rape shield laws.
266 [Vol. 12:1
2003] Protecting Sex 267
referring to his crimes only as "felonies." So too do the newspaper accounts
of Nguyen's heroic battle.'81
Why was the assault erased from the Court's narrative?' 2 From all
news accounts? Where is the victim of the abuse, her story? Would she
want Nguyen to be deported?
183
One may at first imagine that the omission was intentional, a
strategy to represent the plaintiff as sympathetically as possible by the
women's rights organizations, most prominently NOW Legal Defense, that
represented and supported him-and it seems likely that such
considerations led those groups in their briefs to represent Nguyen's crime
merely as an unelaborated felony.
84
181 The joint appendix at the Fifth Circuit contains a copy of Nguyen's guilty plea,
but no details of the crime.
182 Nguyen's story raises interesting parallels to the rape sentencing context. There
is a tension in the context of criminal law between the feminist condemnation of power-
laden sexual crimes, particularly those against girls, and the rehabilitative liberal instinct-
feminists often feel instinctually that murderers should be rehabilitated and rapists should be
punished far more harshly than they currently are. It is interesting that feminists do not seem
to have a similar instinct here, perhaps because the details of the sexual assault are unknown.
183 In Advancing Luna-and Ida B. Wells, Alice Walker complicates the telling of
a rape. The narrator, a black civil rights activist, is overcome with anger when her close
white friend reveals that she was raped by a black man. Alice Walker, Advancing Luna-
and Ida B. Wells, in You Can't Keep a Good Woman Down 93 (1981). She struggles
between the impulse to recount her friend's story and the competing pressure-informed by
a history of lynching and the representation of black men as "creatures of uncontrollable
lust," to "[w]rite nothing. Nothing at all." Id. at 93-94. One might suppose that sexual assault
is missing from Nguyen's story for precisely the same reason. Yet Vietnamese men are not
like black men, in that they were never perceived as rapists and never lynched for it. Rather,
it was the Vietnamese (Vietnamese women, country, and culture) who are represented as
victims, and more cogently as rape victims, throughout the popular literature.
184 NOW Legal Defense is generally unequivocal in its condemnation of sexual
abuse, and it is well known for its legal advocacy of the Violence Against Women Act and
its defense of "women's right to live free from violence." National Organization for Women
Legal Defense and Education Fund Issues-Ending Violence Against Women at
http://www.nowldef.org/html/issues/vio. (There is no basis, it should be noted, for assuming
that Nguyen's victim was female.) In fact, "NOW Legal Defense is determined that violence
against women be punished, not rewarded." NOW Legal Defense and Education
Fund-Preface to Legal Docket at http://www.nowldef.org/html/courts/preface.shtml. What
accounts for the disjunction between the organization's vehement denunciation of abuse and
abusers and its simultaneous commitment to securing citizenship for Nguyen? Ultimately,
their elision of the sexual assault probably does boil down to a practical decision, a legal
strategy to make the petitioner more attractive, a product of administrative convenience in
the furtherance of a struggle that affects far more people than any one case of abuse. Nguyen
had already served his prison term; and perhaps, as they prepared to appeal a far less
compelling case decided in California several months earlier, they felt that there was no
better option. After all, Boulais was a sympathetic father, Nguyen's mother had abandoned
him, and Nguyen was persuasively American. As an advocate of women's rights, NOW
Legal Defense should be commended for its willingness to look beyond the facts of a
particular case. The decision acknowledges that making just laws must come before
punishment. If law indeed structures social relationships and behavior, deporting one sex
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Yet the crime receives barely more attention from the respondents,
who, though they refer elliptically to Nguyen's having "pleaded guilty to
two counts of sexual assault on a child," elaborate no further. The potential
reasons for the elision are manifold. It is possible that Nguyen did no more
than engage in consensual sexual relations, at the age of twenty-two, with a
minor. It is equally possible that Nguyen did not engage in sexual assault at
all; he might have been falsely accused, and he might have pled to avoid a
more "serious" charge. Or perhaps the crime was violent and reprehensible.
Ultimately, the factual resolution is largely irrelevant. Whatever rhetorical
power a fuller narrative might convey, and whatever the rhetorical impact
of a demonstration that the erasure was in fact intentional, the absent assault
pervades and undergirds Nguyen's proceedings.
It is my contention that the erasure of Nguyen's assault-the
silencing of his victim and of the rapes that regularly produce non-citizen
children-is a necessary component of the legal system that continues to
exclude him. At the same time, there remains a trace of the assault in the
disapprobation of the respondent's brief and the majority's opinion. Nguyen
is not a stainless specimen of American values. He pleaded guilty, they
remind us, to two counts of sexual assault. He has committed a nearly
unnamable crime; deportation is his just desert.
The "nearly" in nearly unnamable is of significance. Sexual assault
is a serious charge, and sexual assault on a child is that much worse. But
even the latter does not carry the stigmatization of those crimes, like
sodomy (that infamous crime "not to be named among Christians" 85), most
threatening to the sexual order. In Sexy Dressing. Duncan Kennedy
proposes that the legal system that regulates sexual abuse channels the
practices of abuse into designated forms-a "tolerated residuum" that is
"plausibly attributed to contestable social decisions about what is abuse and
how important it is to prevent it.'' 86 In a related move, the law of sexual
abuse marginalizes the abuser, labels him perverse, only to obscure the
reality that such abuse is habitual and is in fact an inevitable product of the
governmental scheme.
8 7
offender without changing the legal scheme that created him would be unproductive. The
defense of Nguyen reflects a hope that changing the framework will lead to overall changes
in behavior.
185 See, e.g., 4 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 242
(William D. Lewis ed., Reas Welch & Co. 1897) (1769) (referring to sodomy as "peccatum
illud horribile, inter christianos non nominandum," translated as "that horrible sin not to be
named among Christians.").
186 Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing, and the Eroticisation of
Domination, in Sexy Dressing Etc. 123, 137 (1993). For instance, "[t]he system generates
the conditions for the abuses that it tolerates by criminalizing prostitution without trying to
abolish it." Id.
'87 Id. at 138-39 ("A common popular assessment of sexual abuse is that it is
'pathological' behavior .... The basic idea is that men by nature are either normal or
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Kennedy's insight sheds valuable light on the story of Nguyen's
deportation hearings and the subsequent legal battle over his citizenship. By
almost eliding the assault, the government and the Court make it clear that
sexual transgressions are subject to state control. A complete omission of
Nguyen's felony might suggest an inability on the part of the government to
pin it down and provide an adequate remedy, to regulate it. Instead, we
encounter a casual insinuation of a crime that the government has not
bothered to explain. The reference is utterly sterile and unexceptional, and it
lends the crime a sense of the mundane. Sexual assault happens, it seems to
say, and the law takes care of it.'88
However compelling the above explanation, there may be any
number of practical and practically innocuous reasons to underplay
Nguyen's convictions. But what is omitted in Nguven is not just the
incident of assault. Rather, sex is absent altogether. Sex and sexual assault
are twice absent from the account: Nguyen's manifestation of sexual power,
and that of his father. There is no mention of the sexual act that forced
Nguyen from this country, nor is there any trace of the sexual act that
brought him into this world.
2. Censored Sex
As we have seen, there are myriad practical and political
explanations for the Court's inattention to sex in Nguyen, whether in the
form of sexual assault or sexual regulation. What is more surprising is the
inattentiveness to sexuality among reform groups and scholars devoted to
ending sex discrimination.
abnormal, with the latter group perhaps subject to 'cure' through therapy or religious
experience. Sexual abuse is deviance.... Although clear cases of abuse are wrong and
pathological, it is also important to the conventional view that they are exceptional, indeed
much rarer than one would think from the limited empirical evidence...."). Catharine
MacKinnon reached a similar conclusion a decade prior: "Attempts to reform and enforce
rape laws, for example, have tended to build on the model of the deviant perpetrator and the
violent act, as if the fact that rape is a crime means that society is against it, so law
enforcement would reduce or delegitimize it.... Even if [this] were effective in jailing men
who do little difference from what nondeviant men do regularly, how would such an
approach alter women's rapability? Unconfronted are why women are raped and the role of
the state in that." Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An
Agenda for Theory, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State 7 Signs: J. Women in
Culture and Society 515, 643 (1983).
188 Silence is particularly problematic when it descends from the state in order to
preserve the social order. The elliptical reference to Nguyen's assault erases not only the
crime itself, but also the legal structure and process that has inscribed it as a crime.
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a. Willful Silence
If it is an objective of this Article to explain why scholars and
practitioners have chosen to ignore the sexual implications of laws that
affect sex, we must first establish that they have in fact done so consciously.
There is therefore an additional possibility that must be considered,
particularly with respect to the neglected sexual repercussions of § 1409(a)
as a general matter: simple oversight.
Although there is ample evidence that controlling immoral and
deviant sexual practices was a contributing rationale for domestic birth
status law, it is unlikely that sexual considerations played a prominent role
in the enactment of § 1409(a). Of course, lack of congressional intent
cannot explain why legal challenges to birth status statutes have ignored the
sexual ramifications of regulating "legitimacy" (though perhaps the
doctrinal limitations at issue in the previous section do enough). However,
it is unsurprising that in a legal regime critical only of discriminatory
intent,189 a regulatory byproduct affecting a behavioral category already
subject to overt state control would go unnoticed. Similarly, given the many
laws explicitly prohibiting categories of sexual conduct, neither the media
nor advocacy groups were likely to devote substantial resources to
investigating the sexual repercussions of immigration law.
Still, simple omission seems too glib an explanation. After all,
many of the same practical impediments apply to stereotyping, a cultural
culprit that has received extensive attention from feminists and legal
practitioners alike. Although assumptions about likely and proper parenting
responsibilities may have implicitly affected the drafting of § 1409(a), it is
very unlikely that Congress enacted the provision in order to entrench
discriminatory gender roles. Why is it that feminist organizations have
nevertheless undertaken to root out stereotype in relatively innocuous state
policies, many of which ostensibly penalize men? Though enticing, the
answer cannot be that laws like § 1409(a) are not really very likely to
influence sexual choices. After all, obscure provisions of naturalization law
are unlikely to really imbue women with a sense of subordination.
b. The Politics of Sexuality
It is tempting, at first blush, to think the under-coverage of the sex
at stake in birth status and related laws is anomalous-which may be why
the simple oversight rationale has so much intuitive appeal. In recent years,
189 Section 1409(a) facially discriminates against men. It is nevertheless relevant in
this context that equal protection doctrine applies only to cases of intentional discrimination.
While disparate impact may provide evidence of intent, mere unequal results will be
inadequate to invalidate a statute.
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cultural feminists have come under attack precisely because they have
overemphasized sexuality. In the context of sexual harassment, for instance,
recent criticism has suggested that targeting sex-based rather than sexual
harassment would be far more advantageous to securing equal employment
opportunities and equal treatment for women. There is an important
difference between the two modes of sexual regulation, however. Sexual
harassment law is about women's right to be free from unwanted sexual
attention, a position that is consistent with both feminist sex-negativism and
popular, idealized images of women resisting lewd, impure, and tainted
sexual advances. It is a negative choice to be unsexed. The choice at stake
in § 1409(a), on the other hand, is the positive choice to engage in sex
without undue repercussions. Women's sexual desires and freedoms are not
yet a legitimate subject of reform.
The latter point raises the question of whether feminist lawyers and
scholars have failed to recognize the sexual repercussions of § 1409(a) or
have rather chosen not to act for political reasons. It is true, as a descriptive
matter, that many potential advocates have simply not been trained to look
for this kind of "sex discrimination." But even those who are aware of the
problem have a real incentive to focus on more pressing and perhaps more
winnable battles.
For example, many women's groups active in family law have been
going to great lengths to represent pregnancy and childbirth as special
burdens that warrant special rights. There are real reasons to preclude a
father from intruding on a mother-child relationship years after the child's
birth. And, of course, when it comes to bodily autonomy, most feminists
agree that women deserve greater decisionmaking authority than their
partners in determining whether to have a child. Finally, women are
biologically bound to bear the consequences of unprotected sex that results
in pregnancy; whereas men, whatever the law may say, are not. Casting
childbirth as a consequence of mutual and autonomous decisions of equal
importance on the part of two sexual partners jeopardizes women's
authority as mothers. Allowing men to claim U.S. citizenship for their
children even without demonstrating a social relationship would give them
an additional, very powerful bargaining chip, further skewing both social
and sexual relationships.
In addition to these politically practical rationales for sidestepping
sexuality, there is an important jurisprudential factor unrelated to equal
protection doctrine. In short, litigating sexuality may appear to be a losing
battle. Governments routinely prohibit certain categories of sexual behavior,
including fornication, sodomy, and prostitution. Although it is conceivable
that the Supreme Court would recognize a constitutional right to non-
marital sex, the stark denial of a constitutional basis for sexual autonomy in
Bowers v. Hardwick' 90 makes it very unlikely. The marital bedroom may be
190478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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sacrosanct, but it is not because of what goes on in bed. Given an
increasingly conservative political landscape and the enormous
repercussions a pro-sex decision would carry, the current Court is not likely
to quarrel with the government's right to regulate the citizenship of children
produced through constitutionally unprotected sex.
CONCLUSION: WHY SPEAK?
This Article has sought to examine the consequences on women's
autonomy and power of state regulation of sex. In conclusion, I examine the
consequences of silence, of omitting the regulation of sex from legal and
academic discussion.
I began writing this article with the intent of identifying a doctrinal
formula by which discriminatory sexual incentive systems might be
remedied. It was clear from the outset that existing equal protection
jurisprudence, as manifest in the Court's family law decisions, does not
encompass unequal sexual incentive schemes. It nevertheless seemed
certain not only that the doctrine could be stretched to accommodate
sexuality, but also that the benefits of such an endeavor for women's rights
would be plain.
Ultimately, I was unable to locate a legal basis on which such a
doctrinal expansion might be grounded. It should by now be clear that
discussion and openness are unlikely to make a substantive difference, in
the sense of changing the law, at least in the near future. Existing legal
doctrine does not provide a remedy for infringements on sexual autonomy.
Simply put, there is no right to sex, and the current Court is not about to
create one. 191 Until it does, sexual inequalities can be redressed only by
means of equal protection challenges-and equal protection, for the reasons
described above, is unlikely to accommodate sexual disincentives.
More importantly, it has become evident that the practical
advantages of such an endeavor are far from unequivocal. The effort to
expand sexual equality, at least in the context of § 1409(a), entails a
necessary curtailment of women's autonomy as mothers. In order to liberate
women from the disproportionate burdens of parenthood, we must empower
men as fathers. In fighting for women's sexual autonomy-for women's
ability, at home and abroad, to engage in sexual activity without assuming
undue legal accountability for their decisions-we deprive mothers of a
foothold for arguing that biological difference demands legal recognition.
The reality is that many unmarried women, after bringing their children to
term, feel entitled to participate in raising them.
'9' The Supreme Court will reconsider the due process "right to sex" this term, in
Lawrence v. Texas. However, even a favorable holding in that case would not feasibly
provide a basis for reexamining § 1409(a). If there is a right to sex, it is based on privacy
rather than autonomy. See supra note 15.
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This analysis therefore brings us full circle. The consequence of
reform would be that American men could claim citizenship for their
children based solely on DNA evidence of paternity, without demonstrated
commitment to their care. With the ability to confer citizenship comes
tremendous coercive power; while the child may be entitled to citizenship,
the non-citizen mother will still be excluded. And if a non-citizen mother
might lose her child to an American stranger, a non-citizen woman may
refrain from having sex with an American man.
Against that backdrop, it is difficult to identify a practical
advantage of drawing attention to the way § 1409(a) curtails sexual
freedom. Given the futility of speaking out, why is it important to challenge
the regulation of sexuality? Or, framed differently, does silence really
matter? In the end, we are left with little more than the truism that the
failure of our legal system to provide a means for redressing sexual
inequality is of unquestionable importance, and whatever the practical
repercussions of breaking the silence, doing so remains the better course.
1 92
Just as silence is indispensable to creating and regulating sexual
transgression, it is a powerful means of curtailing sexual expression.
Whatever one's feeling on the possibility of good sex-whether one
believes that all sex is power-laden and coercive or instead hopes to
encourage it and break it away from traditional ("conservative") values-
the inevitable "liberal" conclusion is that excising sex from democratic
dialogue is constrictive and destructive. Acknowledging that the state is
influencing and regulating people's sexual choices, and examining the ways
in which such regulations impact women, is critical to understanding why
the government would want to regulate marriage and childrearing in the
first place. It is only through open discussion that boundaries are broken
and redrawn.
192 It would seem inappropriate and shortsighted, in discussing a statutory
framework that implicitly regulates sexuality and a body of legal and academic criticism that
fails to notice or mention that regulation, not to at least acknowledge the influential
contributions of Michel Foucault to the theory of sexual juridical discourses. Foucault
famously propounded that "silence itself-the things one declines to say, or is forbidden to
name, the discretion that is required between different speakers-is less the absolute limit of
discourse, the other side from which it is separated by a strict boundary, than an element that
functions alongside the things said, with them and in relation to them within over-all
strategies." Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1: An Introduction 11
(Robert Hurley, trans., 1990) (1978).
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